{"id":838,"date":"2026-09-08T07:24:40","date_gmt":"2026-09-08T07:24:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/x.sheep-mine.ts.net\/index.php\/the-hindu-upsc-news-analysis-for-08-september-2026\/"},"modified":"2026-09-08T07:24:40","modified_gmt":"2026-09-08T07:24:40","slug":"the-hindu-upsc-news-analysis-for-08-september-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/x.sheep-mine.ts.net\/index.php\/the-hindu-upsc-news-analysis-for-08-september-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"The Hindu UPSC News Analysis For 08 September 2026 | Legacy IAS"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><br \/>\n<\/p>\n<div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 1 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-1\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS2 \u00b7 GS3 \u2014 Urban Governance &#038; Disaster Management<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>Delhi HC orders audit of hostels as collapse toll hits 7; nearly 8,000 died in structure collapses in five years<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>The death toll in the collapse of a building housing students in Satya Niketan rose to seven on Monday. The Delhi High Court expressed deep concern over the safety of students living in paying guest accommodations across the capital and directed the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to inspect all PG hostels under its jurisdiction within a week. A data analysis in the same edition shows that 7,874 people died in building collapses across India between 2020 and 2024.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Background &#038; Key Facts \u2014 The Incident<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Arrests:<\/strong> Police arrested <strong>Hariram Gupta, 82<\/strong>, a retired Indian Air Force sergeant; his wife <strong>Urmila Gupta, 75<\/strong>; and their son <strong>Mahesh Gupta, 52<\/strong>. The property was registered in Ms. Gupta&#8217;s name, while the men&#8217;s PG was allegedly run by her husband and son. A search is on for the operators and the labour contractors carrying out repairs in the basement.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Administrative action:<\/strong> <strong>Five MCD officials<\/strong> \u2014 the civic body responsible for issuing PG licences and enforcing building norms \u2014 were suspended. Chief Minister <strong>Rekha Gupta<\/strong> said the government is exploring a policy to govern buildings used for several purposes, including PG accommodations.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Rescue:<\/strong> The 28-hour operation was declared complete at 5 p.m. on Monday. At least 12 people were brought to the AIIMS Trauma Centre and three to Safdarjung. Six were brought dead at AIIMS and one died later of injuries; at least three remain critical.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The High Court&#8217;s direction:<\/strong> A Bench of <strong>Chief Justice D.K. Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia<\/strong> said the deaths raised serious concerns about student safety and the acute shortage of hostel facilities for outstation students. The deceased hailed from Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh. The court directed the MCD to ascertain whether PG buildings had valid permissions, complied with building bye-laws, and whether violations had occurred.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Beyond the owner:<\/strong> The court held that responsibility could not, <em>prima facie<\/em>, be confined to the property owner \u2014 the role of <strong>university authorities and the MCD<\/strong> also required examination. It directed the civic body to inspect at the highest executive level and fix responsibility on public servants if the building was found to be unauthorised.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Custody:<\/strong> A Delhi court remanded Mr. Gupta and his wife to judicial custody; their son was sent to police custody for two days.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Political response:<\/strong> Leader of the Opposition <strong>Rahul Gandhi<\/strong> said the government followed a &#8220;shameful pattern&#8221; of no preventive action, then grandstanding and fixing blame on lower-level officials, citing six deaths in a Saidulajab collapse and 22 in a Hauz Rani fire in four months. Congress leader <strong>Kanhaiya Kumar<\/strong> called the BJP&#8217;s &#8220;four-engine government&#8221; in Delhi a &#8220;killing machine&#8221;. The Congress demanded inspection of all PGs, construction of hostels within Delhi University, a <strong>rent control law<\/strong> for hostels and PGs, and compensation of at least <strong>\u20b91 crore<\/strong> per bereaved family. Party leader <strong>Abhishek Dutt<\/strong> alleged that scrapping <strong>Section 466(A) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act through the Jan Vishwas Act<\/strong> had weakened criminal action against builders undertaking illegal or dangerous construction.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>The Data Point \u2014 Nearly 8,000 Deaths in Five Years<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>National total:<\/strong> <strong>7,874 people<\/strong> were killed in building collapses across India between <strong>2020 and 2024<\/strong>, per analysis of the National Crime Records Bureau&#8217;s <strong>Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India (ADSI)<\/strong> reports. Delhi recorded <strong>169 deaths<\/strong> in the same period.<\/li>\n<li><strong>ADSI categories:<\/strong> Five sub-categories fall under collapse of structures \u2014 Collapse of Dwelling House\/Residential Building, Collapse of Official\/Commercial Building, Collapse of Dam, Collapse of Bridge, and Others. The analysis excludes dam and bridge collapses.<\/li>\n<li><strong>State ranking (2024):<\/strong> <strong>Uttar Pradesh 223 deaths<\/strong> (highest), <strong>Maharashtra 220<\/strong>, Madhya Pradesh 174, Rajasthan 131, Gujarat 115, Jharkhand 92, Karnataka 69, Keralam 62, Haryana 58, Tamil Nadu 57, Bihar 50, <strong>Delhi 42<\/strong> (12th highest), Chhattisgarh 42, Telangana 36, Andhra Pradesh 32.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Per capita burden:<\/strong> Despite being geographically smaller, densely populated NCT Delhi has been among the top 15 States every year since 2020, and recorded the <strong>second- or third-highest deaths per million population in 2022, 2023 and 2024<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recent numbers:<\/strong> With ADSI 2025 not yet released, a media compilation shows at least <strong>70 people died in 20 incidents since January 2025<\/strong> \u2014 at least three deaths a month. Since 2024 there have been at least <strong>34 incidents killing more than 90 people<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Delhi incident map:<\/strong> Named localities include Kaushik Enclave and Burari (Jan 2025, 5 deaths), Kharkari Nahar and Najafgarh (May 2025, 4 deaths), Shakti Vihar Mustafabad (Apr 2025, 11 deaths), Janta Mazdoor Colony Seelampur (Jul 2025, 6 deaths), Near Saket Metro Station (May 2026, 6 deaths), Hari Nagar Extn Jahtpur (Aug 2025, 8 deaths) and Satya Niketan (Sep 2026, 7 deaths).<\/li>\n<li><strong>Civic response:<\/strong> Acting &#8220;in predictable haste&#8221;, the MCD said it will seal all illegal five-storey and taller buildings &#8220;immediately&#8221;. The data, the analysis argues, indicates a systemic problem demanding long-term strategies that account for the growing need for affordable housing.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background<\/h3>\n<p>Building safety is governed by the <strong>National Building Code of India, 2016<\/strong>, the <strong>Model Building Bye-Laws, 2016<\/strong> of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, and municipal bye-laws, with structural stability and occupancy certificates as the primary compliance instruments. Under the <strong>Disaster Management Act, 2005<\/strong>, structural collapse is treated as a man-made disaster, with response through the NDRF and District Disaster Management Authorities. Municipal functions including regulation of land-use and building construction are listed in the <strong>Twelfth Schedule<\/strong> (74th Constitutional Amendment). Affordable rental housing is supported through the <strong>Affordable Rental Housing Complexes<\/strong> scheme under PMAY-Urban. The <strong>Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act, 2023<\/strong> decriminalised a large number of minor offences across statutes to ease business compliance \u2014 the reform whose application to building offences the Opposition now questions.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The court&#8217;s key move is widening liability:<\/strong> By refusing to confine responsibility to the owner and naming the MCD and university authorities, the High Court shifts the frame from criminal negligence by an individual to institutional failure \u2014 which is what the five-year death toll actually describes.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Decriminalisation versus deterrence:<\/strong> If provisions penalising dangerous construction were diluted for ease-of-business reasons, the expected cost of violation falls below the rental income from an over-occupied structure. Decriminalisation is defensible for procedural lapses; it is harder to defend where the offence risks life.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Enforcement by tragedy:<\/strong> Sealing all five-storey-plus illegal buildings after seven deaths is the reactive pattern the data condemns. Buildings extended floor by floor over decades in public view represent continuous, visible non-enforcement.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The housing arithmetic is the root cause:<\/strong> Universities house a small fraction of enrolled students; migrant students then absorb both high rents and unsafe conditions. Sealing supply without adding hostel capacity will push students into cheaper and less safe accommodation elsewhere.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Per-million burden is the telling metric:<\/strong> Delhi&#8217;s 42 deaths look modest against Uttar Pradesh&#8217;s 223 until adjusted for population \u2014 at which point the capital&#8217;s enforcement failure becomes visible.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Create a statutory licensing regime for paying-guest accommodation with occupancy caps, fire safety, egress norms, structural certification and periodic renewal.<\/li>\n<li>Mandate structural safety audits for buildings above a defined age, and require municipal permission and engineer supervision for any basement excavation or repair in load-bearing structures.<\/li>\n<li>Restore proportionate criminal liability for construction that endangers life, while retaining decriminalisation for genuinely procedural lapses.<\/li>\n<li>Expand university and government hostel capacity and scale Affordable Rental Housing Complexes so that sealing drives do not displace students into worse housing.<\/li>\n<li>Publish a geo-tagged public register of licensed PGs and inspection outcomes to make enforcement auditable.<\/li>\n<li>Strengthen ADSI reporting granularity so that policy can distinguish structural failure, unauthorised extension and monsoon-related kutcha collapse.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">National Building Code 2016<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Model Building Bye-Laws 2016<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">ADSI &#038; NCRB<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Twelfth Schedule<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Jan Vishwas Act 2023<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">ARHC scheme<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">15M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;Nearly 8,000 deaths in five years indicate that building collapses in India are a governance failure, not a series of accidents.&#8221; Examine the regulatory, judicial and housing-policy interventions required to address this. (15 marks, 250 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: Building safety governance<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>The Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India report is published by the National Crime Records Bureau.<\/li>\n<li>Regulation of land-use and construction of buildings is a function listed in the Twelfth Schedule of the Constitution.<\/li>\n<li>The National Building Code of India is a statute enacted by Parliament and is directly enforceable across all States.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 The National Building Code is a recommendatory model code issued by the Bureau of Indian Standards; it acquires legal force only when adopted into State or municipal bye-laws. Statements 1 and 2 are correct.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 2 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-2\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS2 \u00b7 GS1 \u2014 Governance &#038; Society<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>Karnataka High Court orders tech-driven overhaul of temple finance<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>Observing that &#8220;temple funds are not ordinary funds and that they are trust property, gathered from the faith of devotees and held for the deity&#8221;, the High Court of Karnataka has issued a series of directions aimed at bringing transparency and preventing financial mismanagement in all temples controlled by the Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments Department.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Background &#038; Key Facts<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The case:<\/strong> <strong>Justice Suraj Govindaraj<\/strong> issued the directions while upholding an order passed in <strong>October 2020<\/strong> by the executive officer of the <strong>Sri Durgaparameshwari temple in Brahmavar taluk, Udupi district<\/strong>, dismissing an employee for misappropriating <strong>\u20b98,750<\/strong>. The court also found no fault with the <strong>2024<\/strong> order of the HRI&#038;CE Commissioner affirming the dismissal.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The systemic finding:<\/strong> Pointing to a large number of litigations related to misappropriation of temple funds, the court said the department has a duty of supervising and safeguarding these funds under the <strong>Karnataka Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act, 1997<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The direction:<\/strong> The Commissioner and the <strong>e-Governance Department<\/strong> must create a <strong>unified, centralised electronic financial management system<\/strong> for all temples, designed to ensure that it is &#8220;impossible to issue a second receipt bearing the same number&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The specific failure:<\/strong> The dismissed employee was able to generate a <strong>second receipt with the same receipt number<\/strong> \u2014 a paper-based control weakness that the technology mandate is designed to close.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background \u2014 State Administration of Temples<\/h3>\n<p><strong>Article 25<\/strong> guarantees freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion, subject to public order, morality and health, while <strong>Article 25(2)(a)<\/strong> expressly saves State regulation of &#8220;economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice&#8221;. <strong>Article 26<\/strong> gives religious denominations the right to manage their own affairs in matters of religion and to administer property in accordance with law. The Supreme Court&#8217;s foundational ruling in <strong>Shirur Mutt (1954)<\/strong> drew the line between religious practice \u2014 which the State cannot regulate \u2014 and secular administration of religious property, which it can. Endowments legislation therefore exists in most southern States, and comparable statutes govern Sikh and Wakf institutions. <strong>Charitable and religious endowments<\/strong> appear in the Concurrent List (Entry 28), while religious institutions and their administration are also covered by State legislation.<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-flow\">\n<p>Devotee offering<\/p>\n<p>\u2192<\/p>\n<p>Receipt at counter<\/p>\n<p>\u2192<\/p>\n<p>Temple account<\/p>\n<p>\u2192<\/p>\n<p>Departmental audit<\/p>\n<p>\u2192<\/p>\n<p>Endowment use<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>A small sum, a large principle:<\/strong> The misappropriation was \u20b98,750, but the court&#8217;s framing \u2014 that temple funds are trust property held for the deity \u2014 converts routine service jurisprudence into a fiduciary standard applying to the entire department.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Technology as an internal control:<\/strong> Duplicate receipt numbers are the oldest cash-handling fraud. Requiring a system where it is technically impossible to reissue a number is process design, not merely digitisation \u2014 the right instruction, because it removes discretion rather than merely recording it.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The larger governance question:<\/strong> State control of temple administration remains contested. Critics argue that the State supervises Hindu institutions in a way it does not supervise others, and that revenues are diverted; defenders point to the Article 25(2)(a) mandate and the historical record of hereditary mismanagement. Improved financial transparency strengthens the defenders&#8217; case.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Judicial direction to build IT systems:<\/strong> Courts increasingly issue technology mandates. This can be effective, but implementation depends on budget, procurement and capacity in the e-Governance Department \u2014 none of which a judgment can supply.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Scale of the endowment economy:<\/strong> Temple offerings, land and jewellery constitute a substantial asset base. Without a centralised system, no reliable aggregate accounting of these assets exists.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Build the centralised system with tamper-evident, sequentially locked digital receipting, real-time reconciliation and audit trails accessible to the Commissioner.<\/li>\n<li>Publish annual audited accounts of major temples, including income, expenditure and asset registers, in the public domain.<\/li>\n<li>Complete a digital inventory of temple land, jewellery and endowments with periodic physical verification.<\/li>\n<li>Strengthen internal audit capacity and mandate rotation of cash-handling staff, alongside a whistle-blower channel.<\/li>\n<li>Ensure that improved revenue supervision is matched by transparent, rule-based utilisation for temple upkeep, priest welfare and heritage conservation.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">Article 25(2)(a) &#038; Article 26<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Shirur Mutt case<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Concurrent List Entry 28<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">HRI&#038;CE Act 1997<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Essential religious practices doctrine<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">10M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;The Constitution permits State regulation of the secular aspects of religious institutions but not of religion itself.&#8221; Discuss with reference to the administration of temple finances. (10 marks, 150 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: Religious freedom and State regulation<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Article 25(2)(a) permits the State to regulate or restrict economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice.<\/li>\n<li>Article 26 confers on religious denominations the right to administer property in accordance with law.<\/li>\n<li>Charitable institutions and religious endowments are subjects listed exclusively in the State List.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 Charities, charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions appear as Entry 28 of the Concurrent List, not the State List. Statements 1 and 2 correctly state Articles 25(2)(a) and 26.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 3 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-3\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS2 \u2014 International Relations<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>India&#8217;s opportunity to put BRICS back together<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>Ahead of the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on 12\u201313 September, T.S. Tirumurti \u2014 former Permanent Representative of India to the UN and former BRICS Sherpa \u2014 argues that BRICS has strayed far from where it started, and that the Delhi summit gives India a chance to restore its original purpose as a vehicle for reformed multilateralism rather than allowing it to become an anti-West bloc.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Background &#038; Key Facts \u2014 Origins and Drift<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Original purpose:<\/strong> BRICS was formed to give a greater voice to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa in global governance and institutions, particularly financial and economic ones, and to aim for a more equitable multilateral order. India was an enthusiastic participant, seeing it as a vehicle for genuine reform.<\/li>\n<li><strong>India&#8217;s first summit:<\/strong> The <strong>fourth BRICS summit, hosted by India in 2012<\/strong>, was themed &#8220;Global Stability, Security and Prosperity&#8221;. The Indian presidency helped lead to the establishment of the <strong>New Development Bank<\/strong>, and other Indian initiatives followed including integration of a <strong>counter-terrorism architecture<\/strong> into BRICS work.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The China challenge:<\/strong> China saw BRICS as a counterpoise to Western domination and needed a group of emerging economies to amplify its global ambitions \u2014 BRICS countries accounted for nearly <strong>20% of world GDP in 2010<\/strong>. China wanted to use <strong>BRICS-Plus and BRICS Outreach<\/strong> to reach the Global South and consolidate a profile as a second pole in a bipolar world.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Selective reform:<\/strong> India, Brazil and South Africa found Chinese support for multilateral reform selective \u2014 China <strong>resisted supporting their bid for permanent UNSC seats<\/strong>. India consequently focused more on BRICS consolidation and intra-BRICS matters.<\/li>\n<li><strong>India&#8217;s 2026 chairship theme:<\/strong> Four pillars \u2014 <strong>Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability<\/strong> \u2014 drawing on the vision of &#8220;Humanity First&#8221; and a &#8220;people-centric&#8221; approach.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The consensus principle under threat:<\/strong> The 2019 Brasilia Summit was held without invited guest countries \u2014 just the five original members. But in <strong>2020, under the Russian presidency<\/strong>, probably the first non-consensus chair&#8217;s statement, on COVID-19, was issued. At the <strong>BRICS Foreign Ministers&#8217; meeting in May 2026 in New Delhi<\/strong>, non-consensus documents again resulted from the inability of new members to agree. If this continues, the author warns, BRICS will cease to be effective \u2014 the risk of going the way of the <strong>SCO<\/strong>, where the majority can bulldoze views through.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Expansion, Cohesion and Direction<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The expansion:<\/strong> China pushed for expansion of the New Development Bank and then of BRICS itself; <strong>India and Brazil resisted<\/strong> but were unsuccessful. BRICS now has <strong>11 members<\/strong> following the addition of <strong>Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Indonesia<\/strong>, plus <strong>10 partner countries<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Vindication:<\/strong> New members have started fighting among themselves. While the original five have serious differences, they know how to manage them for the greater good; new members are &#8220;subverting BRICS through their bilateral conflicts&#8221;. The warning: BRICS should not go the way of <strong>SAARC<\/strong>, paralysed by bilateral disputes.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Non-West versus anti-West:<\/strong> India has tried to keep BRICS a &#8220;non-West&#8221; group against pressure to turn it anti-West. This is increasingly difficult with China competing with the U.S. for global leadership, Russia at war with Ukraine, and Iran being bombarded by the U.S. and Israel. It is harder still when <strong>Brazil and India have been subjected to punitive tariffs<\/strong> by President Trump and the U.S. Congress is considering legislation empowering the President to levy punitive tariffs on countries importing Russian oil.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The strategic squeeze:<\/strong> The Quad is described as &#8220;being emasculated by the U.S.&#8221;, India-U.S. relations under great pressure, and Pakistan being courted by the U.S. at India&#8217;s expense. The more erratic the U.S. is towards BRICS, the greater the chance of BRICS drifting in the wrong direction. Fortunately, many other members share India&#8217;s effort to prevent an anti-Western drift \u2014 they &#8220;want change, but not geopolitical realignment with China and Russia&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Parallel structures:<\/strong> Both the U.S. and China are setting up parallel structures and standards in <strong>artificial intelligence, digital and Internet governance, data ownership, state control, 5G\/6G and telecom, satellite navigation, and electric vehicles<\/strong>. China has set up a new <strong>World AI Cooperation Organisation in Shanghai<\/strong>, in addition to the <strong>AIIB, the Belt and Road Initiative and the Digital Silk Road<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>De-dollarisation:<\/strong> The push for a parallel BRICS currency is receiving a lukewarm response, since many members are uncomfortable with a <strong>renminbi-dominated currency<\/strong> and would prefer merely interlinking payment systems, central bank digital currencies and national-currency transactions. China is formally launching <strong>mBridge<\/strong>, an alternative financial payment system, after a successful pilot. &#8220;The last thing India wants is an alternative Bretton Woods system dominated by China.&#8221;<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>The Course Correction Proposed<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Reformed multilateralism:<\/strong> Mr. Modi first articulated the vision at the <strong>2018 BRICS Summit in South Africa<\/strong> at the leaders&#8217; retreat; by <strong>2019<\/strong> it had entered the BRICS Summit document in Brasilia, with India, Brazil and South Africa pushing for it. The author argues the time has come to revive this agenda.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Global South middle powers:<\/strong> In Davos, the Canadian Prime Minister spoke of broadly West-centric middle powers coming together. A Global South middle power is very different \u2014 and if there is a credible organisation of Global South middle powers, it is BRICS.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Acknowledged problems:<\/strong> China is hardly a middle power and has disproportionate influence; India and China need greater synergy on emerging global issues even as bilateral differences are contained; and some middle powers that ought to be represented are not.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The stake:<\/strong> With many countries wanting to join, India should proactively embrace the BRICS reform agenda to serve its larger interest of <strong>multi-alignment<\/strong> \u2014 because if India does not, others will take BRICS in a different direction.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background<\/h3>\n<div class=\"lias-table-wrap\">\n<table>\n<tr>\n<th>Element<\/th>\n<th>Detail<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Origins<\/td>\n<td>Acronym coined in 2001; first standalone summit at Yekaterinburg, 2009; South Africa joined 2010<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>New Development Bank<\/td>\n<td>Agreed at the Fortaleza Summit, 2014; headquartered in Shanghai<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Contingent Reserve Arrangement<\/td>\n<td>Short-term liquidity support against balance of payments pressures<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Decision rule<\/td>\n<td>Consensus; annual rotating chairship<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>India&#8217;s hosting record<\/td>\n<td>2012 (New Delhi), 2016 (Goa), 2021 (virtual), 2026 (New Delhi)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Recurring agenda<\/td>\n<td>UNSC and IMF quota reform, counter-terrorism, local-currency settlement, development finance<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Expansion traded weight for coherence:<\/strong> A larger BRICS commands more of the world&#8217;s population and output, but consensus among eleven members with active bilateral hostilities is far harder than among five. The SAARC analogy is apt and uncomfortable.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Consensus erosion is the real institutional risk:<\/strong> Once chair&#8217;s statements can substitute for joint declarations, the veto that protected minority positions disappears, and India loses its principal instrument for preventing capture.<\/p>\n<p><strong>India&#8217;s dilemma is externally driven:<\/strong> Punitive U.S. tariffs on India and Brazil push exactly the members who resist an anti-West turn towards accepting one. India&#8217;s ability to hold the &#8220;non-West&#8221; line depends partly on choices made in Washington.<\/p>\n<p><strong>De-dollarisation is not one thing:<\/strong> Local-currency invoicing and interlinked payment systems reduce transaction costs and sanctions exposure without creating a bloc currency. Conflating them with a BRICS currency serves those who want the harder version.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Reformed multilateralism has limits:<\/strong> India has championed the agenda for years without securing UNSC or IMF reform. Reviving the framing is easier than delivering an outcome, and repeated non-delivery erodes the credibility of the demand itself.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Contrast with the Chinese Ambassador&#8217;s framing:<\/strong> Yesterday&#8217;s op-ed in the same newspaper presented BRICS as an engine for a shared future; today&#8217;s presents it as a grouping needing rescue from capture. Reading them together is instructive on how differently the two chairs-in-succession conceive the platform.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Use the Delhi chairship to reaffirm consensus as the decision rule and resist normalisation of non-consensus chair&#8217;s statements.<\/li>\n<li>Anchor deliverables India actually wants: UNSC and IMF quota reform language, counter-terrorism commitments, digital public infrastructure, climate and development finance for the Global South.<\/li>\n<li>Support interlinked payment systems and local-currency settlement explicitly, while formally rejecting a common BRICS currency.<\/li>\n<li>Institutionalise a code of conduct so that members&#8217; bilateral disputes are kept out of BRICS documents, learning from SAARC&#8217;s paralysis.<\/li>\n<li>Position BRICS as the platform of Global South middle powers while maintaining Quad, IMEC and I2U2 engagement \u2014 the practical content of multi-alignment.<\/li>\n<li>Insist that new BRICS institutions in AI and finance have genuinely shared governance rather than single-member hosting and control.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">New Development Bank &#038; CRA<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">BRICS-Plus &#038; Outreach<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">BRICS expansion members<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">mBridge &#038; CBDC<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">AIIB, BRI, Digital Silk Road<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Reformed multilateralism<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">15M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;An expanded BRICS is a more representative but less coherent grouping.&#8221; Critically examine India&#8217;s objectives as chair of BRICS and the risks of the grouping acquiring an anti-Western orientation. (15 marks, 250 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: BRICS composition and mechanisms<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements about BRICS:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Decisions in BRICS are taken by consensus, and the chairship rotates annually among members.<\/li>\n<li>The New Development Bank was established under the aegis of BRICS with its headquarters in Shanghai.<\/li>\n<li>The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is a BRICS institution created alongside the Contingent Reserve Arrangement.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 The AIIB is a separate multilateral development bank headquartered in Beijing with a much wider membership including European countries, and is not a BRICS institution. Statements 1 and 2 are correct.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 4 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-4\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS2 \u00b7 GS3 \u2014 IR, Trade &#038; Defence<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>Natural partners: India and Belgium build ties across sectors despite differences<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>The Hindu&#8217;s editorial assesses the visit of Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever to Delhi as part of a larger puzzle of India&#8217;s ties with European countries, which have gained salience across economic relations, defence relations and strategic ties.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Background &#038; Key Facts<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Trade agenda:<\/strong> At the top of talks between Prime Ministers <strong>Bart De Wever<\/strong> and <strong>Narendra Modi<\/strong> were bilateral trade opportunities once the <strong>India-European Union Free Trade Agreement is signed \u2014 expected in December<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Trade profile:<\/strong> India-Belgium trade is about <strong>$13 billion<\/strong>, a third of which comes from over a century of collaboration in the <strong>diamond industry<\/strong>. <strong>Antwerp<\/strong> is a global hub for diamond trading, while <strong>Mumbai and Surat<\/strong> provide the biggest cutting and polishing services.<\/li>\n<li><strong>New areas:<\/strong> Once the EU FTA is signed, both hope to benefit from collaboration in <strong>renewable energy and food processing<\/strong>. The two Prime Ministers agreed to a target of <strong>doubling bilateral trade in the next five years<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Defence:<\/strong> Despite being surrounded by friendly European allies, Belgium has a robust high-tech defence industry \u2014 <strong>small arms, drone and counter-drone technology, ammunition and naval defence<\/strong> \u2014 and is keen to enter the Indian market, with India seeking to diversify procurement beyond global powers. The two sides agreed on an <strong>MoU for co-development of military hardware<\/strong> and signed a <strong>letter of intent on defence cooperation<\/strong>. India will appoint a <strong>resident defence attach\u00e9 to Brussels<\/strong>, complementing Belgium&#8217;s move.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The geopolitical framing:<\/strong> At a business event, Mr. De Wever said Europe is now realising the truth of India&#8217;s &#8220;warnings&#8221; on <strong>strategic autonomy<\/strong> from global powers and <strong>over-dependence in trade and industrial production<\/strong>, referring in particular to China.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Modi&#8217;s framing:<\/strong> Democratic values, a market economy and people-to-people ties make India and Belgium <strong>&#8220;natural partners&#8221;<\/strong> \u2014 a theme he has promoted this past year as he has stepped up visits to Europe and received European leaders in Delhi, in the run-up to his <strong>Brussels visit later this year for the FTA<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The Russia question:<\/strong> The editorial notes that Mr. De Wever&#8217;s visit comes in the same week that New Delhi prepares to welcome Russian President <strong>Vladimir Putin<\/strong> for the BRICS summit \u2014 demonstrating &#8220;a new maturity for both European countries and India&#8221; and sensitivity to their respective positions on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, indicating that ties outweigh Europe&#8217;s enmity and India&#8217;s deep friendship with Moscow.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background \u2014 India and the European Union<\/h3>\n<p>The EU is among India&#8217;s largest trading partners and a leading source of FDI. Negotiations for a Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement began in <strong>2007<\/strong>, stalled in <strong>2013<\/strong>, and resumed in <strong>2022<\/strong> alongside parallel tracks on an Investment Protection Agreement and a Geographical Indications agreement. The <strong>India-EU Trade and Technology Council<\/strong>, launched in 2022, is only the EU&#8217;s second such arrangement after the one with the United States. Friction points include the EU&#8217;s <strong>Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism<\/strong>, the Deforestation Regulation, supply chain due-diligence rules, agriculture and dairy market access, data adequacy and movement of professionals. Belgium hosts the EU&#8217;s institutional centre in Brussels, which gives a bilateral relationship there additional multilateral value. India&#8217;s defence diversification effort operates through the <strong>Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020<\/strong>, positive indigenisation lists, and the iDEX and Defence Industrial Corridor frameworks.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Small partner, large signal:<\/strong> Belgium is not among India&#8217;s most important partners by volume, but its position as the EU&#8217;s institutional host and a diamond-trade hub makes the relationship disproportionately useful in the run-up to the FTA.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Convergence on China, not on Russia:<\/strong> Europe&#8217;s belated embrace of strategic autonomy language is a convergence India can bank. But the Putin visit in the same week shows that Europe&#8217;s tolerance is conditional and situational rather than settled.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Defence diversification has a ceiling:<\/strong> Co-development MoUs and letters of intent are early-stage instruments. Converting them into orders requires technology transfer terms, offset compliance and price competitiveness against established suppliers.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The diamond dependency is a legacy, not a strategy:<\/strong> A third of bilateral trade in one commodity chain is a concentration risk, particularly as lab-grown diamonds restructure the industry. Renewable energy and food processing are the diversification test.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Doubling trade in five years is ambitious:<\/strong> It presumes the EU FTA is signed in December and ratified promptly \u2014 a process that in the EU can involve national and sometimes regional parliamentary approval and is historically vulnerable to agricultural lobbies.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Conclude and ratify the India-EU FTA with a workable resolution on CBAM exposure, data adequacy and movement of professionals.<\/li>\n<li>Convert the defence MoU into concrete co-development projects with defined technology transfer and Indian manufacturing content.<\/li>\n<li>Diversify the Belgium relationship beyond diamonds into green hydrogen, port logistics, food processing and biotechnology.<\/li>\n<li>Institutionalise the resident defence attach\u00e9 exchange with a structured annual defence dialogue.<\/li>\n<li>Sustain India&#8217;s balanced position on Ukraine while deepening European partnerships, using strategic autonomy as shared vocabulary rather than a point of friction.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">India-EU FTA &#038; TTC<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Antwerp diamond trade<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">CBAM<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Strategic autonomy<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">10M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;India&#8217;s engagement with smaller European states is increasingly a route to the European Union itself.&#8221; Examine with reference to recent bilateral outcomes in trade and defence. (10 marks, 150 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: India-EU economic engagement<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Antwerp in Belgium is a major global centre for the trading of rough and polished diamonds.<\/li>\n<li>The India-EU Trade and Technology Council was the European Union&#8217;s first such council with any partner.<\/li>\n<li>Negotiations for an India-EU trade agreement first began in 2007, stalled in 2013 and were resumed in 2022.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (b)<\/b> \u2014 The EU&#8217;s first Trade and Technology Council was with the United States; the India council is its second. Statements 1 and 3 are accurate.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 5 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-5\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS3 \u2014 Science, Technology &#038; Development<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>Ground control: ISRO must focus on space technology as a tool for development<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>The Hindu&#8217;s editorial notes the irony that on the day ISRO achieved its greatest success of the year \u2014 the launch of its first geosynchronous imaging satellite EOS-05 on a temperamental GSLV \u2014 its employee organisations demanded clarity on its long-term plans. The editorial argues the underlying question is whether India&#8217;s space vision remains anchored to social development or has shifted to prestige.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Background &#038; Key Facts<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The long-standing signal:<\/strong> Since the <strong>Indian Space Policy of April 2023<\/strong>, the message has been that ISRO would one day, in the unspecified future, stop making commercial satellites and launch rockets. Clearly inspired by <strong>NASA<\/strong>, it expects to focus on ambitious exploratory missions and, literally, moonshots.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The letter:<\/strong> Co-signed by <strong>nine employee associations<\/strong> and addressed to the chairman, it seeks clarity on <strong>staff strength, recruitment and the outsourcing of core functions<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The responses:<\/strong> ISRO says it will &#8220;not be privatised or reduced&#8221;; <strong>IN-SPACe<\/strong>, set up to facilitate private participation, says the agency will &#8220;not be diminished&#8221;, only that the industry&#8217;s role must grow. The editorial&#8217;s point: <strong>both are silent on the core concern \u2014 potential job losses<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The underlying tension:<\/strong> Does ISRO&#8217;s vision of India&#8217;s space sector align with its founding principles of not being enamoured of space races and being laser-focused on space technology as a tool for social development? Or is the image of power \u2014 India as one of a handful of space-faring countries with a mushrooming of space startups \u2014 now the bedrock of that vision?<\/li>\n<li><strong>The budget comparison:<\/strong> NASA&#8217;s budget is <strong>16 times<\/strong> the Department of Space&#8217;s \u2014 <strong>$24.4 billion against \u20b913,705 crore<\/strong>. NASA too has scaled back since the 1960s: from <strong>0.7% of American GDP in 1966 to 0.1% now<\/strong>, and from <strong>36,000 civil servants at Apollo&#8217;s peak to about 14,000 today<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The Indian difference:<\/strong> Unlike NASA, which in its early years designed and made every nut and bolt, ISRO has always had a manufacturing relationship with the private sector (<strong>Walchandnagar, L&#038;T<\/strong>). What is different now is that the buzz is not about established companies building on experience but <strong>new entrants with fleeting foreign capital, most interested in satellite data as a service<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The strategic gap:<\/strong> There is &#8220;yet no serious reckoning with the might of China&#8217;s space programme&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The editorial&#8217;s conclusion:<\/strong> If India&#8217;s space sector in 2035 is to be a source of export earnings and a nucleus of value-added services bringing jobs and absorbing skilled labour, hard choices today may be worth it. But jumping onto a bandwagon of space &#8220;as fuel for the science fiction fantasy of billionaires and colonial notions of conquest, to align with some misplaced notion of an &#8216;exclusive&#8217; club \u2014 is foolhardy. ISRO must have a transparent policy that spells this out.&#8221;<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background \u2014 ISRO&#8217;s Founding Doctrine<\/h3>\n<p><strong>Vikram Sarabhai&#8217;s<\/strong> formulation remains the reference point: India&#8217;s justification for a space programme was never to compete in the exploration of the Moon or planets, but to apply advanced technology to the real problems of people and society. That doctrine produced <strong>SITE<\/strong> (Satellite Instructional Television Experiment, 1975-76), the INSAT communications series, the IRS remote sensing series for resource mapping, tele-education and telemedicine, cyclone warning, and fisheries advisories.<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-table-wrap\">\n<table>\n<tr>\n<th>Institution<\/th>\n<th>Role<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Department of Space \/ Space Commission<\/td>\n<td>Policy and budgetary authority, directly under the Prime Minister<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>ISRO<\/td>\n<td>R&#038;D, mission execution, strategic and scientific missions<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>IN-SPACe (2020)<\/td>\n<td>Single-window authorisation and promotion of non-government entities<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>NewSpace India Limited (2019)<\/td>\n<td>Commercial arm; technology transfer and demand-driven missions<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Indian Space Policy 2023<\/td>\n<td>Defines roles of ISRO, NSIL, IN-SPACe and private players<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The sharpest observation is about the composition of the private sector:<\/strong> Established manufacturing partners like L&#038;T and Walchandnagar built capability over decades; venture-funded start-ups optimised for data services operate on different time horizons and capital cycles. Transferring launch vehicle production assumes a supplier base with the former&#8217;s patience, not the latter&#8217;s.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Silence on employment is a governance failure, not a communications lapse:<\/strong> Assurances that ISRO will not be &#8220;diminished&#8221; do not answer a question about sanctioned strength. A published workforce transition plan is the minimum that a restructuring of this scale requires.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The prestige-versus-development framing is a real choice with budget consequences:<\/strong> A crewed lunar mission and a space station consume resources that could fund agricultural advisory, disaster management and telemedicine applications. Both have value; the editorial&#8217;s demand is that the trade-off be made explicitly and transparently.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The NASA analogy cuts both ways:<\/strong> NASA&#8217;s shrinkage accompanied the rise of a genuinely capable commercial launch industry with sustained domestic demand. India&#8217;s commercial demand base is still thin, so the same sequence may not follow.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The China comparison is the strategic omission:<\/strong> With a far larger budget, an operational space station, lunar sample returns and a large satellite constellation programme, China&#8217;s capability gap is the benchmark against which Indian restructuring should be assessed \u2014 and is largely absent from the debate.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Publish a transparent long-term policy document specifying which functions transfer to industry, on what timeline, and with what workforce implications.<\/li>\n<li>Give written assurances on sanctioned strength and recruitment, and consult recognised service associations on structural decisions.<\/li>\n<li>Retain and fund the societal applications mandate \u2014 agriculture, disaster management, telemedicine, education \u2014 as a distinct budget line, not a residual.<\/li>\n<li>Support domestic demand creation for space services so that private capability is built on Indian orders rather than fleeting foreign capital.<\/li>\n<li>Certify industry capability through defined milestones before ISRO withdraws from any launch or satellite domain, preserving sovereign capability for strategic payloads.<\/li>\n<li>Undertake an explicit capability assessment against China&#8217;s space programme to inform budget and mission priorities.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">Indian Space Policy 2023<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">IN-SPACe &#038; NSIL<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Space Commission &#038; DoS<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">SITE experiment<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Vikram Sarabhai&#8217;s doctrine<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">15M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;India&#8217;s space programme was founded on the application of technology to social problems, not on prestige.&#8221; Critically examine whether the current restructuring of ISRO&#8217;s role remains faithful to that founding vision. (15 marks, 250 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: India&#8217;s space governance<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>The Department of Space functions directly under the Prime Minister.<\/li>\n<li>The Satellite Instructional Television Experiment was an early Indian programme demonstrating the use of satellite communication for rural education.<\/li>\n<li>NewSpace India Limited is the regulatory and authorisation body for private space activity in India.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 Authorisation and promotion of private space activity is the function of IN-SPACe; NSIL is the commercial arm of the Department of Space. Statements 1 and 2 are correct.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 6 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-6\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS3 \u2014 Economy, Trade &#038; Innovation<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>U.S. tariffs are not what is holding back Indian research<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>Arindam Goswami of the Takshashila Institution argues that the widespread worry that high American tariffs will choke research in the affected industries rests on a mistaken assumption \u2014 the sectors exposed to tariffs and the sectors that actually invest in research barely overlap. The real problem, he writes, predates the trade fight and will outlast it.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Background &#038; Key Facts<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The truce:<\/strong> After months of escalation, Washington and New Delhi stepped back a few months ago \u2014 the penalty tied to India&#8217;s purchases of Russian oil was removed, the reciprocal tariff was cut, and <strong>medicines and most electronics stayed exempt<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The exposed sectors:<\/strong> The 2019 loss of duty-free access and the 2025 tariff hit affected <strong>organic chemicals, plastics, base metals, machinery, auto components and leather<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Research intensity in those sectors:<\/strong> Indian metals firms spend about <strong>0.4% of sales on R&#038;D<\/strong> against a global average of nearly <strong>1.6%<\/strong>. Auto and parts makers spend a little over <strong>2%<\/strong> versus a global average of <strong>5%<\/strong>. Electrical equipment firms spend less than <strong>2%<\/strong> against the same 5% benchmark. These industries &#8220;were research-thin long before any tariff arrived&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The core claim:<\/strong> India&#8217;s research effort is concentrated in <strong>pharmaceuticals and automobiles<\/strong>, and almost everything else does little. A tariff on chemicals or steel cannot cut research spending that was never there. Patenting and research spending in the exposed sectors show no clear break during the tariff years attributable to the duties.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The behavioural argument:<\/strong> Research is a fixed and risky investment that pays off only when a product sells at scale. A firm facing a smaller export market can retreat to cheaper, undifferentiated goods, or invest in products a tariff cannot easily replace. Indian industry has chosen the first path for decades.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Where tariffs do matter:<\/strong> Of the two research-intensive sectors, <strong>pharmaceuticals secured an exemption in the February deal, while automobiles did not<\/strong>. The <strong>25% U.S. duty on auto parts<\/strong> remains, and metal tariffs raise input costs for downstream engineering and component firms. So the live risk runs through <strong>autos<\/strong>, not the broad manufacturing economy.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The real problem:<\/strong> India spends a very small percentage of output on research, well below competitor countries, and the private industry share is also well below global leaders. What industry does spend goes towards routine development and testing rather than research creating new products. By one comparison, <strong>Nvidia alone spends nearly as much on research as all of Indian industry combined<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The policy response:<\/strong> The government&#8217;s <strong>\u20b91 lakh crore Research, Development and Innovation (RDI) scheme<\/strong>, launched late last year, offers long-tenure, low-cost capital to firms in sunrise and strategic areas such as <strong>artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum technology and biotechnology<\/strong>. The author&#8217;s critique: the money is pointed at the frontier, while the industries most exposed to trade shocks and most in need of moving up the value chain are older sectors the scheme is not designed for. &#8220;A chemicals or auto-parts maker that has never run a research programme will not start now because of a loan aimed at deep tech.&#8221;<\/li>\n<li><strong>Measurement failure:<\/strong> India&#8217;s official research figures &#8220;arrive years late and undercount private spending&#8221;. A country that cannot see where its research is going cannot steer it; a faster, firm-level record linking research spending to exports would let policymakers act before damage shows.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background \u2014 India&#8217;s R&#038;D Landscape<\/h3>\n<p>India&#8217;s <strong>Gross Expenditure on Research and Development (GERD)<\/strong> has hovered well below 1% of GDP for decades, against roughly 2-3% for major economies and higher still for Israel and South Korea. Distinctively, the government accounts for the dominant share of Indian R&#038;D spending, whereas in advanced economies the business sector contributes the majority. Institutional reform has come through the <strong>Anusandhan National Research Foundation (ANRF)<\/strong>, established under the ANRF Act, 2023, replacing the Science and Engineering Research Board and designed to catalyse private and philanthropic funding. Sectoral instruments include the <strong>Production Linked Incentive<\/strong> schemes, the <strong>India Semiconductor Mission<\/strong>, the National Quantum Mission and the National Deep Tech Startup Policy. India&#8217;s Global Innovation Index rank has improved substantially over the past decade, driven largely by institutions, market sophistication and knowledge outputs rather than by business R&#038;D expenditure.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The overlap argument is empirically sharp:<\/strong> Diagnosing a research crisis in sectors that never conducted research misattributes cause. It also conveniently allows industry to blame external policy for a domestic behavioural failure.<\/p>\n<p><strong>But the counterfactual is untested:<\/strong> Firms in commoditised sectors may have avoided research precisely because assured low-margin export markets made differentiation unnecessary. Tariffs could, in principle, either force upgrading or force retreat \u2014 the article assumes retreat based on past behaviour, which is reasonable but not proven.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The design critique of the RDI scheme is the most actionable point:<\/strong> Deep-tech capital does not build absorptive capacity in a firm with no research function. Sectoral upgrading requires shared testing infrastructure, engineering talent and process innovation support, not venture-style finance.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Conditionality is the right instrument:<\/strong> Tying tariff relief or input-cost offsets to demonstrated research spending converts protection from a subsidy for the status quo into a lever for capability building \u2014 provided verification is credible.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Measurement is the binding constraint:<\/strong> Without timely firm-level data linking research spending to exports and patents, every policy in this space is designed blind and evaluated retrospectively.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Autos deserve the attention:<\/strong> The auto sector is India&#8217;s largest private R&#038;D spender after pharma, employs at scale, and is simultaneously facing a 25% U.S. duty and an EV transition \u2014 the one place where trade policy and innovation policy genuinely intersect.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Redesign a component of the RDI scheme for mature sectors \u2014 shared testing facilities, process R&#038;D, engineering talent subsidies \u2014 rather than deep-tech-only instruments.<\/li>\n<li>Tie any tariff relief or input-cost offset for exposed industries to verified increases in core research spending.<\/li>\n<li>Protect pharmaceuticals and automobiles in further trade negotiations, since tariffs in these sectors do affect innovation.<\/li>\n<li>Build a timely, firm-level research expenditure register linked to export and patent data, replacing the current lagged aggregates.<\/li>\n<li>Strengthen the ANRF&#8217;s mandate to leverage private and philanthropic funding into applied industrial research.<\/li>\n<li>Weight incentives towards core research rather than routine testing and quality certification.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">GERD as % of GDP<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">ANRF Act 2023<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">RDI scheme<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">PLI schemes<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Global Innovation Index<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Reciprocal tariffs<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">15M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;India&#8217;s innovation deficit is a problem of firm behaviour, not of trade policy.&#8221; Critically examine this proposition and evaluate whether current research funding instruments are designed for the sectors that most need to move up the value chain. (15 marks, 250 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: India&#8217;s research funding architecture<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>The Anusandhan National Research Foundation was established by an Act of Parliament and subsumed the Science and Engineering Research Board.<\/li>\n<li>In India, the government sector accounts for a larger share of gross expenditure on research and development than the business enterprise sector.<\/li>\n<li>India&#8217;s gross expenditure on research and development exceeds 2% of its GDP.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 India&#8217;s GERD has remained well below 1% of GDP, which is the central concern in the debate, making statement 3 incorrect. Statements 1 and 2 correctly describe the ANRF and the unusual government-dominated funding structure.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 7 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-7\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS2 \u00b7 GS1 \u2014 Society, Health &#038; Technology Regulation<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>Teen agency beyond Meta&#8217;s reckoning<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>Nikhila Natarajan, co-founder of the Teens, Family, and Technology Lab at Rutgers University, writes that while Meta&#8217;s $17.1 billion settlement with U.S. States is being framed as a reckoning over addictive platform design, teen voices remain largely absent from the debate \u2014 and that adolescent media use is better understood as a striving for agency than as passive victimhood.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Background &#038; Key Facts<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The settlement:<\/strong> Meta&#8217;s <strong>$17.1 billion<\/strong> settlement with U.S. States is making headlines as a reckoning over addictive platform design.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The historical frame:<\/strong> Debates about youth and technology have focused on media effects \u2014 what teens do with media, or what media does to teens. Nearly 100 years ago, the <strong>Payne Fund Studies<\/strong> marked the first systematic exploration of this dynamic, examining the impact of movies on children. With every new wave of technology, youth audiences are cast as passive, trapped or targeted.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The developmental framework:<\/strong> Teen media use resonates with a metaphor from developmental psychology \u2014 <strong>a race car that can go very fast, but whose brakes are still being built<\/strong>. Teens are primed to learn more rapidly than at any other stage, yet that power makes them more vulnerable to negative stimuli. Their ability to plan and prioritise develops gradually even as they exhibit heightened sensitivity to rewards.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Why design matters:<\/strong> When short-form video loops shrink the gap between media experiences to <strong>15 or 30 seconds<\/strong>, the onus of decision-making becomes the young person&#8217;s problem at a time when the braking system is still being built.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Boredom as the entry point:<\/strong> Across the <strong>13-to-16 age group<\/strong>, teens say short-form videos are shrinking their attention spans, but their reflections point to a persistent entry point \u2014 <strong>boredom<\/strong>, a developmental driver. As adolescents orient towards peers and crave independence while living under adult restrictions, they open an app for a quick distraction and stay for hours.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Peer dynamics and quantified popularity:<\/strong> On platforms where popularity is quantified through <strong>public likes and follower counts<\/strong>, every interaction gets a scoreboard \u2014 incredibly stressful for an adolescent hyper-sensitive to social inclusion and exclusion.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Evidence from Australia&#8217;s ban:<\/strong> Two systematic surveys by Bursztyn and colleagues found Australian teens report needing roughly <strong>70% of their peers to quit social media before they are willing to quit themselves<\/strong> \u2014 a collective-action problem.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Platform inventory:<\/strong> Lab research shows adolescents navigate an average of <strong>7 to 12 different platforms daily<\/strong> \u2014 Instagram and Facebook compete with Snapchat, YouTube, Pinterest, Discord and Spotify.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Teen counter-strategies:<\/strong> Some teens craft <strong>micro-frictions<\/strong> to push back \u2014 Pinterest is popular with girls wanting to escape performative sociality; music streaming competes with short-form video; some delete apps intermittently. These are &#8220;behavioural signatures of adolescent metacognition \u2014 literally, thinking about thinking&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The conclusion:<\/strong> AI-fuelled media design continues to operate at the limits of adolescent development. Understanding the contradictions of adolescent development invites us to reconsider teen media use as a striving for agency.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background \u2014 Regulating Minors Online<\/h3>\n<div class=\"lias-table-wrap\">\n<table>\n<tr>\n<th>Instrument<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023<\/td>\n<td>Defines a child as under 18; requires verifiable parental consent; prohibits tracking, behavioural monitoring and targeted advertising directed at children<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>IT Rules, 2021<\/td>\n<td>Due diligence, grievance officers and content takedown obligations for intermediaries<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>POCSO Act, 2012<\/td>\n<td>Criminalises online sexual offences against children<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Australia&#8217;s under-16 ban<\/td>\n<td>Statutory minimum age for social media accounts, with obligations on platforms<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>NEP 2020<\/td>\n<td>Digital literacy and socio-emotional learning in school curricula<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The agency framing is a genuine corrective:<\/strong> Policy built on the assumption of passive victimhood produces bans and blocks; policy that recognises adolescent metacognition can build on the self-regulation teens are already attempting.<\/p>\n<p><strong>But agency does not neutralise asymmetry:<\/strong> A thirteen-year-old crafting micro-frictions is contending with recommendation systems optimised by teams of engineers against measured engagement. Recognising agency is not the same as assuming a fair contest.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The 70% finding reframes the ban debate:<\/strong> If teens will only quit when most peers do, individual choice is structurally constrained, and a coordinated statutory floor \u2014 the Australian approach \u2014 is a solution to a collective-action problem rather than paternalism.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Settlements are not regulation:<\/strong> A $17.1 billion payment is priced against revenue; it does not alter the design incentives that produced the harm. Design-level obligations \u2014 default settings, absence of infinite scroll for minors, no quantified public metrics \u2014 would.<\/p>\n<p><strong>India&#8217;s enforcement gap:<\/strong> The DPDP Act&#8217;s verifiable parental consent requirement is strong on paper but faces an implementation problem \u2014 age assurance without creating a new identity-surveillance layer is unresolved globally.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Beware the moral panic pattern:<\/strong> The Payne Fund reference is a warning. Each generation&#8217;s technology has been blamed for youth decline, and evidence of harm has often been weaker than the alarm. Rigorous, longitudinal Indian evidence is largely absent.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Regulate design, not just content \u2014 default privacy settings, removal of public metrics for minors, break prompts and limits on autoplay for under-18 accounts.<\/li>\n<li>Operationalise the DPDP Act&#8217;s child provisions with a workable, privacy-preserving age assurance framework.<\/li>\n<li>Fund independent Indian longitudinal research on adolescent digital use before importing conclusions from other jurisdictions.<\/li>\n<li>Embed digital literacy, attention management and socio-emotional learning in school curricula under NEP 2020, involving parents.<\/li>\n<li>Strengthen mental health support in schools, since platform design interacts with an existing adolescent mental health burden.<\/li>\n<li>Include adolescent voices in consultative processes on platform regulation rather than legislating entirely on their behalf.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">DPDP Act 2023 \u2014 child provisions<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">IT Rules 2021<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Australia&#8217;s under-16 social media ban<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Payne Fund Studies<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Adolescent metacognition<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">10M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;Regulating minors&#8217; social media use requires addressing platform design rather than only content.&#8221; Discuss in the light of India&#8217;s data protection framework and international experience with age-based restrictions. (10 marks, 150 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: Children and digital regulation<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements about the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>It defines a child as an individual who has not completed eighteen years of age.<\/li>\n<li>It requires verifiable consent of a parent or lawful guardian before processing a child&#8217;s personal data.<\/li>\n<li>It permits targeted advertising directed at children provided parental consent has been obtained.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 The Act prohibits tracking, behavioural monitoring and targeted advertising directed at children; parental consent does not cure that prohibition. Statements 1 and 2 are correct.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 8 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-8\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS1 \u00b7 GS4 \u2014 Society &#038; Ethics<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>The incongruity of caste and science<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>Following a poster that appeared at IIT-Mandi on 4 September assigning occupational and social functions to varna categories, Vasudevan Mukunth argues that while science cannot pronounce on the moral equality of humans, it can and does refute the claim that caste rests on inherited biological differences \u2014 showing instead that caste is the cause of biological differences, not their inheritor.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Background &#038; Key Facts<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The trigger:<\/strong> A poster at IIT-Mandi on <strong>4 September<\/strong> said the role of &#8220;Brahmanas&#8221; is to &#8220;spread god&#8217;s message&#8221;, that of &#8220;kshatriyas&#8221; to &#8220;protect society and spirituality&#8221;, of &#8220;vaishyas&#8221; to &#8220;drive economy, support others&#8221;, and of &#8220;shudras&#8221; to &#8220;serve higher classes&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The normative contrast:<\/strong> The system laid out in the <em>Manusmriti<\/em> holds that birth says something essential about who a person is supposed to be, with persons born into specific categories assigned a place in the division of labour and a set of permitted relationships and social rights. Modern constitutional thinking is radically different: per the <strong>Magna Carta<\/strong>, the <strong>English Bill of Rights<\/strong> and constitutional democracies today, individuals possess rights that depend on more than their place in a social hierarchy. <strong>The fundamental rights of the Indian Constitution are attached to persons and citizens, not to inherited social functions.<\/strong><\/li>\n<li><strong>The limits of science:<\/strong> That all humans must be treated equally is a moral and constitutional position, not a scientific one \u2014 science does not carry moral or constitutional authority.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Cause, not consequence:<\/strong> While some defenders of caste claim it is based on inherited biological differences, the system is really the <strong>cause<\/strong> of the differences rather than their inheritor. The human organism develops as its genes interact with its environment, and caste-based discrimination affects those environments.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Evidence cited:<\/strong> Studies on the <strong>social determinants of health<\/strong> have revealed caste-related inequities in healthcare and access to healthcare, while <strong>social epigenetics<\/strong> has found that social circumstances can induce biological changes via mechanisms affecting the way genes are regulated.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The 2009 genetics study:<\/strong> In a landmark study, geneticists reported that most present-day Indians descended from <strong>two differentiated ancient populations which mixed extensively before endogamy took root<\/strong>; present Indian groups contain mixes of these ancestries. The team also found substantial genetic differences between communities today thanks to a long history of <strong>endogamy<\/strong>. Other studies have reported strong <strong>founder effects<\/strong> \u2014 when a new population emerges from a small group and inherits its lack of genetic diversity. As the article puts it, &#8220;the genome does not announce that these people were ordained to marry one another but records the fact that they elected to do so&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Neuroplasticity:<\/strong> The human nervous system is very plastic and rewires itself in response to every experience in a life-long process. Not everyone is good at everything, but plasticity means the neurological system develops together with each human&#8217;s environment, interests, temperament and individual choice, giving rise to a variety of abilities.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The cultural argument:<\/strong> Just as caste constrains the plasticity of the brain, it constrains the human capacity for culture. <em>Homo sapiens<\/em> can accumulate knowledge and pass it on so others need not learn from scratch; caste-based discrimination <strong>restricts the spread of knowledge and narrows the social range<\/strong> over which this defining capacity can operate \u2014 &#8220;as if a student&#8217;s ability to solve a differential equation has anything to do with the status of their ancestors&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><strong>What science does say:<\/strong> That all humans are members of one species, that their development is shaped by their experiences, and that <strong>social environments can become embodied<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background \u2014 Constitutional Provisions<\/h3>\n<div class=\"lias-table-wrap\">\n<table>\n<tr>\n<th>Provision<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Article 14<\/td>\n<td>Equality before law and equal protection of the laws<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Article 15<\/td>\n<td>Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Article 16<\/td>\n<td>Equality of opportunity in public employment<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Article 17<\/td>\n<td>Abolition of untouchability; its practice in any form is forbidden<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Article 21<\/td>\n<td>Right to life and personal liberty, read expansively to include dignity<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>SC\/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989<\/td>\n<td>Penal provisions for caste-based atrocities<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955<\/td>\n<td>Punishes enforcement of untouchability<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The epistemic modesty is the argument&#8217;s strength:<\/strong> By conceding at the outset that science cannot establish moral equality, the piece avoids the trap of grounding rights in biology \u2014 a move that would leave equality hostage to the next empirical finding.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Inverting the causal arrow is the decisive move:<\/strong> Genetic distinctiveness between endogamous groups is a <em>record<\/em> of centuries of enforced marriage restriction, not a justification for it. Reading the effect as the cause is the fundamental error in biological defences of caste.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Embodiment of disadvantage has policy implications:<\/strong> If social environments become biologically embodied through nutrition, stress and healthcare access, then caste disadvantage is transmitted through mechanisms beyond income \u2014 strengthening the case for affirmative action in health and nutrition, not only education and employment.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The setting compounds the offence:<\/strong> A caste hierarchy poster at an institute of technology is doubly incongruous \u2014 it appears in the one space whose entire premise is that ability is demonstrated, not inherited.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The knowledge-diffusion argument is underused:<\/strong> Framing caste as a restriction on the species&#8217; cumulative cultural capacity converts a moral objection into a developmental one \u2014 discrimination shrinks the talent pool from which a society can draw.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Institutional response matters:<\/strong> Higher education institutions have faced repeated scrutiny over caste discrimination and student suicides. Codes of conduct and equal opportunity cells exist; their activation is inconsistent.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Strengthen and activate SC\/ST cells and equal opportunity offices in higher education institutions, with published grievance data.<\/li>\n<li>Integrate the social determinants of health framework into public health planning so that caste-linked health inequity is measured and addressed.<\/li>\n<li>Include the history and sociology of caste, alongside constitutional values, in technical and professional curricula.<\/li>\n<li>Ensure prompt institutional response to discriminatory content on campus, with transparent inquiry rather than quiet removal.<\/li>\n<li>Expand mentoring, bridge programmes and mental health support for first-generation and marginalised students in elite institutions.<\/li>\n<li>Promote public science communication that distinguishes descriptive population genetics from normative claims about social hierarchy.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">Articles 14, 15, 17<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Protection of Civil Rights Act 1955<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">SC\/ST (PoA) Act 1989<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Endogamy &#038; founder effect<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Epigenetics<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Social determinants of health<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">15M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;Caste is not the consequence of biological difference; it is one of its causes.&#8221; Examine this statement in the light of evidence on endogamy, epigenetics and the social determinants of health, and discuss its implications for public policy. (15 marks, 250 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: Constitutional equality provisions<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Article 17 abolishes untouchability and forbids its practice in any form.<\/li>\n<li>Article 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.<\/li>\n<li>The prohibition under Article 17 operates only against the State and not against private individuals.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 Article 17 is one of the fundamental rights enforceable against private individuals as well as the State, which is why the Protection of Civil Rights Act penalises private enforcement of untouchability. Statements 1 and 2 are correct.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 9 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-9\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS2 \u00b7 GS1 \u2014 IR &#038; Geography<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>UN world map shows Arunachal and Aksai Chin between claim lines<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>A new world map endorsed at the UN during the India-backed &#8220;Correct the Map&#8221; resolution of 4 September has projected India&#8217;s Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin \u2014 which India maintains is part of Ladakh \u2014 as distinct regions caught between Indian and Chinese &#8220;claim lines&#8221;.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Background &#038; Key Facts<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The map:<\/strong> It came up on <strong>1 July<\/strong> during the months-long discussion for the UNGA resolution.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Arunachal Pradesh:<\/strong> The map shows the State&#8217;s <strong>southern border with Assam<\/strong>, indicating the &#8220;Chinese line&#8221;, while <strong>eliminating the State&#8217;s border with Nagaland<\/strong>. It shows the northern border indicating the &#8220;Indian line&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Aksai Chin:<\/strong> The map shows its <strong>eastern borders indicating the &#8220;Indian line&#8221;<\/strong> while presenting the <strong>western borders in what appears to be the &#8220;Chinese line&#8221;<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The critical difference from 2011:<\/strong> These claim lines appear to be a continuation of previous similar UN maps, but <strong>unlike in the 2011 UN map, these lines are not specified as &#8220;claim lines&#8221;<\/strong> in the 1 July map.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Jammu and Kashmir:<\/strong> Depicted with a <strong>dotted line indicating the Line of Control<\/strong>, with an explanatory note stating that the dotted line represents approximately the LoC agreed upon by India and Pakistan, and that the final status of J&#038;K has not yet been agreed by the parties. <strong>There is no comparable note<\/strong> explaining the Arunachal and Aksai Chin depictions.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Status of the map:<\/strong> Non-binding, but it will be used by <strong>multilateral institutions worldwide<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The process:<\/strong> Discussions began in <strong>March 2026<\/strong> when the <strong>African Union<\/strong> supported the <strong>&#8220;Equal Earth&#8221; cartographic projection<\/strong> to more accurately represent Africa \u2014 an approach the AU called <strong>&#8220;cognitive justice&#8221;<\/strong>. <strong>Togo<\/strong> prompted UNGA consultations in April 2026; informal consultations began in July, when the draft map authored by <strong>UN Geospatial<\/strong> was taken up.<\/li>\n<li><strong>India&#8217;s position:<\/strong> The MEA reiterated support for the resolution on Sunday but declared that India voted in favour as a vote on the &#8220;underlying principle of promoting equal-area cartographic representation&#8221;, and highlighted that <strong>the resolution does not constitute endorsement of any specific map, projection or depiction of national boundaries<\/strong>. Spokesperson <strong>Randhir Jaiswal<\/strong>: &#8220;India&#8217;s sovereign territory, including Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, must be depicted in accordance with India&#8217;s official map. Any inaccurate or misleading depiction is unacceptable.&#8221;<\/li>\n<li><strong>Voting record:<\/strong> Per the day&#8217;s quiz page, the resolution for the Equal Earth projection was sponsored by an African country, with <strong>164 supporting<\/strong> and one nation voting against.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Pending:<\/strong> The Ministry is yet to respond to The Hindu&#8217;s query on the separate demarcation of Arunachal and Aksai Chin with contesting claim lines.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background \u2014 Projections and Indian Cartographic Law<\/h3>\n<div class=\"lias-table-wrap\">\n<table>\n<tr>\n<th>Projection<\/th>\n<th>Preserves<\/th>\n<th>Distorts<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Mercator (1569)<\/td>\n<td>Angles and local shape (conformal); straight lines are constant compass bearings<\/td>\n<td>Area severely at high latitudes \u2014 Greenland appears comparable to Africa<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Gall-Peters<\/td>\n<td>Area<\/td>\n<td>Shape<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Equal Earth<\/td>\n<td>Area, with better visual balance<\/td>\n<td>Shape, moderately<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Robinson \/ Winkel Tripel<\/td>\n<td>Compromise across properties<\/td>\n<td>Nothing exactly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table><\/div>\n<p>A curved surface cannot be flattened without distortion, so every projection is a choice about what to preserve. In India, the <strong>Survey of India<\/strong> is the national mapping agency and the authority for official boundary depiction; misrepresentation of India&#8217;s boundaries attracts action under the <strong>Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1961<\/strong>, alongside the framework of the <strong>Guidelines for Acquiring and Producing Geospatial Data, 2021<\/strong> and the <strong>National Geospatial Policy, 2022<\/strong>. On the disputed areas: <strong>Aksai Chin<\/strong> was occupied by China and is claimed by India as part of Ladakh; China claims about 90,000 sq km of <strong>Arunachal Pradesh<\/strong> as &#8220;South Tibet&#8221;; and Pakistan-occupied territory and the Shaksgam Valley ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963 are also Indian claims.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The missing label is the substantive change:<\/strong> The 2011 UN map identified these lines as claim lines. Removing that qualifier converts a depiction of competing claims into what reads as a depiction of fact \u2014 a material shift disguised as a technical redraw.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Asymmetric treatment of two disputes:<\/strong> The map carries an explanatory note for the LoC but none for Arunachal or Aksai Chin. Uniform practice would require either notes for both or neither; the asymmetry is what India must contest.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Non-binding does not mean inconsequential:<\/strong> A UN-produced map becomes a default reference for multilateral institutions, textbooks, agencies and databases. Cartographic repetition, over time, hardens into perceived legitimacy.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The vote-and-caveat strategy:<\/strong> India supported an equity principle championed by Africa while formally recording that the vote endorses no specific map. This preserves Global South solidarity and legal position simultaneously \u2014 but only if the explanation of vote is placed on record and repeatedly invoked.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Eliminating the Nagaland border is a technical error with political effect:<\/strong> Removing an internal State boundary while retaining external claim lines suggests either careless drafting or an unexamined inherited base map \u2014 either way it warrants formal correction.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Cartography as soft power:<\/strong> The episode illustrates that map-making is contested terrain. India&#8217;s own geospatial liberalisation gives it the domestic capacity to participate in international standard-setting rather than only protest outcomes.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Formally demand restoration of the &#8220;claim lines&#8221; label and an explanatory note for Arunachal and Aksai Chin, matching the LoC note.<\/li>\n<li>Place India&#8217;s explanation of vote on record at the UNGA and cite it in all subsequent multilateral cartographic discussions.<\/li>\n<li>Engage UN Geospatial and multilateral agencies directly on base-map sourcing, including correction of the missing Arunachal-Nagaland boundary.<\/li>\n<li>Work with digital platform providers and international publishers to ensure boundary depiction follows the Survey of India&#8217;s official map.<\/li>\n<li>Use the National Geospatial Policy, 2022 to build Indian capability in international cartographic standard-setting bodies.<\/li>\n<li>Continue supporting equitable projection reform with Africa, keeping the projection question distinct from political cartography.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">Equal Earth projection<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Aksai Chin &#038; Shaksgam Valley<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Line of Control vs LAC<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Survey of India<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">National Geospatial Policy 2022<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">UNGA resolutions \u2014 non-binding<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">15M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;Maps are instruments of power as much as of navigation.&#8221; Examine India&#8217;s response to the UN-endorsed world map, and discuss how India can protect its cartographic position while supporting equitable global representation. (15 marks, 250 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: Boundaries and projections<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Aksai Chin is claimed by India as part of the Union Territory of Ladakh.<\/li>\n<li>The Shaksgam Valley was ceded by Pakistan to China under a 1963 agreement, which India does not recognise.<\/li>\n<li>Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly are binding on all member states.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 UNGA resolutions are recommendatory; only Security Council decisions under Chapter VII are binding. Statements 1 and 2 correctly state India&#8217;s territorial position.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 10 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-10\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS2 \u2014 Citizenship &#038; Federalism<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>Manipur government to update NRC with 1951 as base year<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>Manipur Home Minister Konthoujam Govindas informed the 60-member Assembly on Monday that the National Register of Citizens in the State would be updated using 1951 as the base year \u2014 a demand that has divided communities and for which the Centre recently deferred the Census exercise in the State.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Background &#038; Key Facts<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The divide:<\/strong> <strong>Meitei and Naga organisations<\/strong> want the NRC before the Census and delimitation; <strong>Kuki organisations<\/strong> have called it &#8220;premature and unjustified&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Government position:<\/strong> Mr. Govindas said the State would pursue implementation of the NRC with the Centre in line with resolutions adopted by the House \u2014 citing resolutions of <strong>2022, 2024 and 2 September<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The figures:<\/strong> He told the House that <strong>14,992 out of 24,475 &#8220;illegal immigrants&#8221;<\/strong> detected in the State so far have been pushed back into Myanmar. The immigrants entered through three border districts \u2014 <strong>Chandel, Kamjong and Tengnoupal<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The context:<\/strong> Manipur has been grappling with the influx of undocumented Myanmar nationals since the <strong>military coup of February 2021<\/strong>. The government said the pushback process was carried out through <strong>diplomatic channels<\/strong>, and that Deputy Commissioners were instructed to segregate &#8220;illegal immigrants&#8221; from local Indian communities.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Kuki-Zo Council position:<\/strong> On Monday it urged the Centre to conduct the Census in the State, insisting that &#8220;politically motivated demands&#8221; should not obstruct it. In a memorandum to Union Home Minister <strong>Amit Shah<\/strong>, the KZC said any decision on the NRC remained within the Centre&#8217;s constitutional and legal authority and was not driven by &#8220;unsubstantiated&#8221; allegations of demographic changes.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background \u2014 The NRC Framework<\/h3>\n<div class=\"lias-table-wrap\">\n<table>\n<tr>\n<th>Element<\/th>\n<th>Detail<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Legal basis<\/td>\n<td>Citizenship Act, 1955, Section 14A (inserted 2004), and the Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules, 2003<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>NRC 1951<\/td>\n<td>Prepared after the 1951 Census; forms the reference for the Assam exercise<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Assam cut-off<\/td>\n<td>24 March 1971, per the Assam Accord of 1985 and Section 6A of the Citizenship Act<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Assam NRC<\/td>\n<td>Updated under Supreme Court supervision; final list published in August 2019 excluding about 19 lakh persons<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Citizenship \u2014 Union subject<\/td>\n<td>Entry 17 of the Union List; Articles 5-11 of the Constitution<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Inner Line Permit<\/td>\n<td>Extended to Manipur in 2019 under the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Free Movement Regime<\/td>\n<td>Permitted movement up to a specified distance across the India-Myanmar border for border residents; subsequently scrapped\/restricted, with fencing announced<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table><\/div>\n<p>Manipur has been under acute stress since the ethnic conflict that erupted on <strong>3 May 2023<\/strong> between Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities, producing large-scale internal displacement. The State shares a long, porous border with Myanmar, where the post-coup civil conflict has driven cross-border movement into Manipur and Mizoram.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The base year is the whole dispute:<\/strong> 1951 is the reference for the Assam NRC, but Assam&#8217;s operative cut-off is 24 March 1971 under Section 6A. Applying 1951 as the base for Manipur would set a materially stricter standard than anywhere else in India, which is why the choice is contested rather than technical.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Citizenship is a Union subject:<\/strong> A State Assembly resolution can express intent but cannot itself determine citizenship or mandate an NRC. The Kuki-Zo Council&#8217;s point on the Centre&#8217;s exclusive authority is legally sound whatever one thinks of its motivation.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Sequencing is the political fight:<\/strong> Whether the NRC precedes the Census and delimitation determines the population base on which constituencies are drawn \u2014 which is why the demand aligns so precisely with community positions on representation.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Documentary burden in a displaced population:<\/strong> With tens of thousands displaced since May 2023, many households have lost records to arson and displacement. A documentation-heavy exercise conducted now risks converting conflict victimhood into statelessness.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Assam precedent is cautionary:<\/strong> That exercise cost enormous sums, took years, excluded about 19 lakh people including many acknowledged citizens, and remains legally unsettled \u2014 with the excluded lacking a functional appellate remedy for years.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Pushback through diplomatic channels raises non-refoulement questions:<\/strong> Although India is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, non-refoulement is widely regarded as customary international law where return exposes a person to persecution, and Myanmar&#8217;s post-coup conflict makes that a live concern.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Settle the legal question of base year and authority at the Union level with a reasoned public position, rather than leaving it to competing State resolutions.<\/li>\n<li>Complete return and rehabilitation of persons displaced since May 2023, with reconstruction of lost documents, before any enumeration-heavy exercise.<\/li>\n<li>Provide a well-resourced, accessible appellate mechanism with legal aid before, not after, any exclusion list is published.<\/li>\n<li>Distinguish clearly between refugee protection for those fleeing the Myanmar conflict and enforcement against organised illegal entry, in line with humanitarian obligations.<\/li>\n<li>Strengthen border management through fencing, biometric registration at entry points and coordination with Assam Rifles rather than post-facto detection.<\/li>\n<li>Build inter-community consensus through an inclusive consultative process, since an exercise perceived as targeting one community cannot produce legitimate results.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">Citizenship Act 1955 \u2014 Section 6A, 14A<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Assam Accord 1985<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Inner Line Permit<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Free Movement Regime<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Articles 5-11<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Chandel, Kamjong, Tengnoupal<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">15M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;A citizenship register conducted in a conflict-displaced society risks converting victims into stateless persons.&#8221; Critically examine the demand for a National Register of Citizens in Manipur, and the constitutional division of authority involved. (15 marks, 250 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: Citizenship and the NRC<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Citizenship is a subject in the Union List of the Seventh Schedule.<\/li>\n<li>Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 provides for special provisions relating to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord, with 24 March 1971 as the relevant cut-off.<\/li>\n<li>The Inner Line Permit regime was extended to Manipur in 2019.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (d)<\/b> \u2014 All three are correct. Citizenship appears as Entry 17 of the Union List, Section 6A embodies the Assam Accord cut-off, and Manipur was brought under the ILP regime in 2019.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 11 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-11\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS3 \u2014 Defence &#038; Security<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>DAC clears defence acquisition proposals worth \u20b91.10 lakh crore<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>The Defence Acquisition Council, chaired by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, accorded Acceptance of Necessity for a range of acquisition proposals for the armed forces estimated at \u20b91.10 lakh crore, with approximately 98% of the procurements planned to be from Indian industry.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Background &#038; Key Facts<\/h3>\n<div class=\"lias-table-wrap\">\n<table>\n<tr>\n<th>Service<\/th>\n<th>Approvals<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Army<\/td>\n<td><strong>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance vehicles<\/strong>; <strong>High Mobility Vehicles (HMVs)<\/strong>; <strong>self-propelled mechanical mine layers (MMLs)<\/strong>; <strong>Advanced Light Helicopters (ALHs)<\/strong>; <strong>trawl tanks<\/strong> and the <strong>Sarvatra Bridge System<\/strong> \u2014 the last two providing composite crossing capability to fighting formations in varied terrains<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Navy<\/td>\n<td><strong>Arudhra radars<\/strong>, replacing existing air route surveillance radars at various naval air stations; and the <strong>design, development and subsequent procurement of marine gas turbines (MGTs)<\/strong>, crucial for warship propulsion, expected to reduce dependence on foreign vendors<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Air Force<\/td>\n<td>Several proposals aimed at enhancing the war-fighting capabilities of fighters, transport aircraft and helicopters<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Tri-service \/ common<\/td>\n<td><strong>Ground-based multi-purpose jammers (GBMPJ)<\/strong> providing effective jamming against radars; and the <strong>Defence Forces Secure Access Card (DEFSAC)<\/strong> system, replacing paper-based identity cards, passes and permits with interoperable RFID-based smart cards<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background \u2014 How Defence Procurement Works<\/h3>\n<p>The <strong>Defence Acquisition Council<\/strong>, chaired by the Defence Minister, is the apex body for capital acquisition approvals. <strong>Acceptance of Necessity (AoN)<\/strong> is the first formal stage \u2014 an in-principle approval that a capability is required \u2014 after which the Request for Proposal, trials, technical and commercial evaluation, cost negotiation and contract signature follow. The governing framework is the <strong>Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020<\/strong>, whose categorisation hierarchy prioritises <strong>Buy (Indian-IDDM)<\/strong> \u2014 Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured \u2014 followed by Buy (Indian), Buy and Make (Indian), and only then global options.<\/p>\n<p>Indigenisation instruments include the <strong>positive indigenisation lists<\/strong> issued by the Department of Military Affairs and the Department of Defence Production, <strong>iDEX<\/strong> for start-up innovation, the <strong>Technology Development Fund<\/strong>, the Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu <strong>Defence Industrial Corridors<\/strong>, and the corporatisation of the Ordnance Factory Board into seven defence public sector undertakings in 2021. FDI in defence is permitted up to 74% through the automatic route and beyond that through government approval. The <strong>Sarvatra<\/strong> bridge system and the <strong>Advanced Light Helicopter (Dhruv)<\/strong> are indigenous platforms developed by DRDO and HAL respectively.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>AoN is approval, not acquisition:<\/strong> Historically, a significant share of AoNs lapse or take many years to reach contract. The headline figure measures intent, and the meaningful metric is the conversion rate from AoN to signed contract to delivered platform.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The 98% domestic figure is the strategic signal:<\/strong> It reflects the shift under DAP 2020 towards Indian-IDDM categorisation. The question is whether &#8220;domestic&#8221; means genuine indigenous design or assembly with imported critical components and subsystems.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Marine gas turbines are the standout item:<\/strong> Warship propulsion has been a persistent import dependency. A design-and-develop approval, rather than a straight purchase, is exactly the kind of decision that builds a capability rather than filling a gap.<\/p>\n<p><strong>CBRN and electronic warfare reflect a changed threat picture:<\/strong> Reconnaissance vehicles and multi-purpose jammers respond to grey-zone and drone-era warfare, where sensing and spectrum denial matter as much as firepower.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The DEFSAC card is unglamorous but consequential:<\/strong> Replacing paper credentials with interoperable RFID smart cards addresses base access security \u2014 a vulnerability demonstrated in several past incidents.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Absorption capacity is the constraint:<\/strong> Domestic industry must scale delivery quality and timelines. Repeated indigenisation orders without corresponding production capability simply relocate the delay.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Publish AoN-to-contract conversion timelines to make procurement performance measurable and accountable.<\/li>\n<li>Define and audit indigenous content, distinguishing genuine design ownership from licensed assembly.<\/li>\n<li>Fund critical-component ecosystems \u2014 propulsion, sensors, seekers, semiconductors \u2014 where import dependency persists behind assembled platforms.<\/li>\n<li>Deepen private sector participation through iDEX, the Technology Development Fund and the defence corridors, with assured order pipelines.<\/li>\n<li>Strengthen quality assurance and testing infrastructure so indigenisation does not trade capability for self-reliance.<\/li>\n<li>Diversify residual imports across partners, including newer suppliers such as Belgium, to reduce single-source dependence.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">Defence Acquisition Council &#038; AoN<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">DAP 2020 &#038; Buy (Indian-IDDM)<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Positive indigenisation lists<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">iDEX &#038; Technology Development Fund<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Sarvatra bridge system<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Advanced Light Helicopter (Dhruv)<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">10M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;Self-reliance in defence requires ownership of critical subsystems, not merely domestic assembly.&#8221; Examine India&#8217;s defence indigenisation framework in light of recent acquisition approvals. (10 marks, 150 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: Defence procurement<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Acceptance of Necessity is granted by the Defence Acquisition Council and represents an in-principle approval preceding the Request for Proposal.<\/li>\n<li>Under the Defence Acquisition Procedure, 2020, the Buy (Indian-IDDM) category is accorded the highest priority.<\/li>\n<li>Foreign direct investment in the defence sector is permitted up to 100% through the automatic route.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 FDI in defence is allowed up to 74% under the automatic route, with higher levels requiring government approval, so statement 3 is incorrect. Statements 1 and 2 are accurate.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 12 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-12\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS3 \u2014 Internal Security &#038; Economy<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>FATF warns of rise in tech-driven &#8216;digital hawala&#8217; networks<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>The latest Financial Action Task Force report finds that a centuries-old underground banking system is transforming into a tech-enabled network, with virtual assets adding new layers to &#8220;digital hawala&#8221; \u2014 a shift being exploited for purposes ranging from routine money laundering to, in some cases, financing terrorist organisations.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Background &#038; Key Facts<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The report:<\/strong> Titled <strong>&#8220;Investigating Professional Money Laundering, Underground Banking, and the Use of Hawala and Other Similar Service Providers&#8221;<\/strong>, it identifies the <strong>fusion of virtual assets with the traditional hawala system<\/strong> as one of the most significant developments.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The scale:<\/strong> Nearly <strong>70% of surveyed jurisdictions<\/strong> reported the integration of new technologies into such networks.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"lias-table-wrap\">\n<table>\n<tr>\n<th>Form of &#8216;digital hawala&#8217;<\/th>\n<th>Description<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Digital coordination, traditional settlement<\/td>\n<td>Operators use encrypted messaging apps, shared ledgers and online platforms to communicate instructions, recruit clients and couriers, and maintain records \u2014 but settle in cash or trade<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Digital customer interface<\/td>\n<td>Mobile wallets or fintech apps front the service, while settlement between operators still happens via cash or trade<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Virtual asset-based settlement<\/td>\n<td><strong>Stablecoins<\/strong> used to settle balances directly between operators<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Integration with formal digital infrastructure<\/td>\n<td>Funds moved via payment service providers, fintech platforms and <strong>virtual International Bank Account Numbers (IBANs)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>AI-based tools<\/td>\n<td>Automated transaction structuring, dynamic mule-account routing, and high-speed fiat-to-cryptocurrency conversion<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>&#8216;Hawala&#8217; apps<\/td>\n<td>Bundled digital ecosystems combining messaging, cloud storage, social media, Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs), lending apps and even gaming platforms<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table><\/div>\n<p>&#8220;Digital hawala&#8221; is described as a term covering a spectrum of technologies that facilitate the <strong>coordination, execution, settlement, or concealment<\/strong> of transactions.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background \u2014 Hawala and the AML Framework<\/h3>\n<p><strong>Hawala<\/strong> is an informal value transfer system in which money moves without moving \u2014 a customer pays an operator in one country, who instructs a counterpart elsewhere to pay the recipient, with balances settled later through trade, cash or offsetting transactions. It is fast, cheap, requires no identity documentation and leaves minimal audit trail, which makes it attractive to migrant remitters and to launderers alike. In India, such transfers are illegal under the <strong>Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999<\/strong>, with proceeds attracting the <strong>Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-table-wrap\">\n<table>\n<tr>\n<th>Institution \/ Instrument<\/th>\n<th>Role<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>FATF (established 1989)<\/td>\n<td>Global standard-setter for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing; issues the 40 Recommendations; maintains the &#8220;grey list&#8221; (increased monitoring) and &#8220;black list&#8221; (high-risk jurisdictions)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Travel Rule<\/td>\n<td>FATF Recommendation 16, extended to virtual asset transfers, requiring originator and beneficiary information<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>PMLA, 2002<\/td>\n<td>India&#8217;s principal anti-money laundering statute; Virtual Digital Asset service providers brought under its reporting obligations in 2023<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Financial Intelligence Unit-India<\/td>\n<td>Receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Enforcement Directorate<\/td>\n<td>Investigates offences under PMLA and FEMA<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>India&#8217;s Mutual Evaluation<\/td>\n<td>India was placed in the regular follow-up category in its most recent FATF mutual evaluation \u2014 the best available outcome tier<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Stablecoins are the structural break:<\/strong> Traditional hawala required eventual settlement through trade or cash, which created chokepoints for investigators. Stablecoin settlement removes that friction entirely, allowing near-instant, borderless netting outside any bank.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Virtual IBANs blur the formal-informal boundary:<\/strong> When illicit flows ride on licensed payment service providers and fintech rails, the distinction between regulated and underground banking dissolves \u2014 and supervisory responsibility becomes contested.<\/p>\n<p><strong>AI shifts the cost asymmetry towards launderers:<\/strong> Automated structuring and dynamic mule-account routing can generate patterns faster than rule-based monitoring can detect them, requiring supervisors to move to behavioural and network analytics.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The legitimate-use dilemma:<\/strong> Hawala persists partly because formal remittance corridors are slow and expensive. Enforcement alone, without cheaper compliant alternatives, pushes migrant remitters towards illegal channels.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Regulatory arbitrage is the enabler:<\/strong> VASPs operating from permissive jurisdictions can serve users everywhere. Uneven implementation of the Travel Rule across countries is the single largest gap.<\/p>\n<p><strong>India&#8217;s exposure is specific:<\/strong> Large remittance inflows, a substantial informal economy, terror financing risk from across the western border, and rapid fintech adoption make India simultaneously a target and a jurisdiction with strong detection infrastructure through UPI-linked traceability.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Enforce the Travel Rule for virtual asset transfers and strengthen registration and supervision of VASPs operating in India.<\/li>\n<li>Build blockchain analytics and network-analysis capability within the FIU, ED and State cyber cells, with trained forensic personnel.<\/li>\n<li>Tighten KYC and periodic re-verification for current accounts and virtual IBAN arrangements, with automated flagging of mule-account patterns.<\/li>\n<li>Reduce the cost and time of formal remittances so that legitimate demand does not migrate to informal channels.<\/li>\n<li>Deepen international cooperation on jurisdictional arbitrage through FATF-style regional bodies and mutual legal assistance.<\/li>\n<li>Require payment service providers and fintech platforms to conduct enhanced due diligence on high-velocity, low-value structured flows.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">FATF 40 Recommendations<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Grey list vs black list<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Travel Rule<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">PMLA 2002 &#038; FEMA 1999<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">VASPs &#038; stablecoins<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">FIU-India<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">15M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;The convergence of virtual assets with informal value transfer systems has outpaced the regulatory architecture designed to police them.&#8221; Examine, with reference to India&#8217;s anti-money laundering framework. (15 marks, 250 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: Money laundering and FATF<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>The Financial Action Task Force is an inter-governmental body that sets standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.<\/li>\n<li>FATF&#8217;s &#8220;grey list&#8221; refers to jurisdictions under increased monitoring, while the &#8220;black list&#8221; refers to high-risk jurisdictions subject to a call for action.<\/li>\n<li>Hawala transactions are permitted in India under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 provided they are reported to the Reserve Bank of India.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 Hawala transfers are illegal under FEMA and there is no reporting-based exemption; statement 3 is incorrect. Statements 1 and 2 correctly describe FATF and its listing categories.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 13 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-13\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS3 \u00b7 GS2 \u2014 Energy Economy &#038; Welfare<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>LPG: booking interval cut for rural users, and what prompted the latest price hike<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>The Union Petroleum Ministry on Monday reduced the interval between bookings of domestic LPG cylinders for rural consumers from 45 days to 25 days, months after it had been increased during the peak of the West Asia conflict. Separately, oil-marketing companies hiked commercial LPG prices by about \u20b910 per cylinder on 1 September to offset domestic under-recoveries.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Background &#038; Key Facts \u2014 Booking Interval<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The change:<\/strong> The interval for rural consumers is now <strong>25 days<\/strong>, on a par with urban consumers, for whom it remains unchanged at 25 days.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The reason:<\/strong> In a letter to oil marketing companies, the Ministry cited <strong>&#8220;considerable reduction&#8221; in refill backlogs<\/strong> in the current supply situation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>What was tightened and when:<\/strong> At the peak of the West Asia conflict in <strong>March 2026<\/strong>, the booking interval was expanded from <strong>21 days to 25 days for urban and 45 days for rural<\/strong> consumers.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Import dependence:<\/strong> Prior to the conflict, India met <strong>60% of its overall LPG requirement through imports<\/strong>, of which <strong>90% were routed via the Strait of Hormuz<\/strong> \u2014 which faced a blockade during the conflict.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The pivot:<\/strong> Indian OMCs began increasingly importing LPG from the <strong>United States<\/strong>, which now forms <strong>nearly two-thirds of India&#8217;s LPG import basket<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Demand shift:<\/strong> The government&#8217;s push for <strong>piped natural gas (PNG)<\/strong>, among other factors, led LPG consumption to decline by <strong>17.4% in June<\/strong> and <strong>16.2% in August<\/strong> year-on-year.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Distributors&#8217; view:<\/strong> <strong>Chandra Prakash<\/strong>, president of the All-India LPG Distributors Federation, said certain distributors categorised as rural were actually in areas that had developed into full-fledged urban centres, such as <strong>Noida<\/strong> in Uttar Pradesh and <strong>Navi Mumbai<\/strong> in Maharashtra, and would benefit from the move.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Background &#038; Key Facts \u2014 The Price Hike and Under-recoveries<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The hike:<\/strong> After two successive months of decline, OMCs raised prices of the <strong>commercial variant<\/strong> by approximately <strong>\u20b910 per cylinder<\/strong> across the country on <strong>1 September<\/strong>. The <strong>19-kg cylinder in Delhi now costs \u20b92,747.5<\/strong>; the price of the <strong>14.2-kg domestic cylinder remains unchanged<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Under-recovery defined:<\/strong> The losses OMCs incur because of the difference between the price at which they sell to consumers and the price they should receive to cover the cost of production and distribution.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The trajectory:<\/strong> Under-recoveries on the domestic cylinder were <strong>\u20b9188 per cylinder in early August<\/strong>, down from <strong>\u20b9500 in July<\/strong> and more than <strong>\u20b9700 in June<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Segment shares:<\/strong> The packaged domestic segment accounted for <strong>90.4% of all LPG consumption<\/strong> during April-June. About <strong>10.6 crore Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana beneficiaries<\/strong> \u2014 approximately <strong>33% of the domestic segment<\/strong> \u2014 receive an additional subsidy of <strong>\u20b9300 per cylinder<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Expert view:<\/strong> <strong>Prashant Vashisht<\/strong> of ICRA said domestic under-recovery is currently hovering at about \u20b9200 per cylinder, and the commercial hike &#8220;potentially tries to somewhat compensate for that amount, although the proportionate sales of commercial LPG are much smaller. I would not read much into it&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Supply side:<\/strong> Imports of petroleum, oil and lubricants products declined <strong>45.1%<\/strong> between April and July, per the <strong>Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell (PPAC)<\/strong>, attributed to reduced imports of LPG, pet coke and fuel oil. OMCs ramped daily domestic production of bottled hydrocarbon gas from <strong>34,000 to 55,000 metric tonnes<\/strong>; following an <strong>13 August directive<\/strong>, upstream and oil-marketing companies have a daily production target of <strong>63,810 metric tonnes<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Downstream impact:<\/strong> <strong>Manpreet Singh<\/strong> of the National Restaurants Association of India said the standalone impact would be &#8220;negligible&#8221; though it may prompt concerns about future increases. The industrial segment \u2014 glass-making and similar furnace users \u2014 is increasingly transitioning to piped natural gas; per the <strong>PNGRB<\/strong>, industrial sales of piped gas rose <strong>30%<\/strong> between April and June year-on-year.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background<\/h3>\n<p>LPG pricing in India follows an <strong>import parity\/trade parity<\/strong> benchmark linked to the Saudi Contract Price. Domestic cylinder prices are effectively administered, so when international prices rise without a corresponding retail increase, OMCs accumulate under-recoveries, which are periodically compensated through budgetary support. <strong>PMUY<\/strong>, launched in 2016, provides deposit-free LPG connections to women from poor households, with an additional per-cylinder subsidy; the persistent challenge has been refill rates rather than connection numbers. The <strong>PPAC<\/strong> under the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas compiles consumption and import data, while the <strong>PNGRB<\/strong> regulates downstream gas distribution and city gas networks.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Booking intervals are rationing by another name:<\/strong> Extending the rural interval to 45 days during the crisis effectively rationed the segment least able to substitute fuels \u2014 households where reverting to biomass has direct health consequences for women and children.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The rural-urban categorisation is outdated:<\/strong> Distributors classified as rural while serving Noida and Navi Mumbai indicate that the classification tracks historical licence categories rather than current settlement patterns \u2014 an administrative fiction with real consumer consequences.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Import diversification is a genuine strategic gain:<\/strong> Shifting from 90% Hormuz-routed supply to roughly two-thirds U.S. sourcing materially reduces choke-point exposure \u2014 but substitutes one concentration for another and lengthens the freight route.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Falling consumption is ambiguous:<\/strong> A 17% year-on-year decline could reflect welcome PNG substitution or unwelcome demand destruction from higher prices and rationing. Disaggregating PMUY refill rates from overall volumes is essential before reading it as a success.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Cross-subsidy through commercial cylinders:<\/strong> Raising commercial prices to offset domestic under-recovery taxes restaurants, small eateries and street vendors \u2014 an implicit transfer from small business to households, with inflation implications ahead of the festive season.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Import parity pricing versus welfare:<\/strong> Holding the domestic price constant while international prices move is politically necessary but creates fiscal opacity, since the cost surfaces later as budgetary compensation rather than at the point of consumption.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Rationalise the rural-urban distributor classification to reflect current settlement patterns rather than legacy licences.<\/li>\n<li>Track and publish PMUY refill rates, not just connection numbers, as the true measure of clean cooking access.<\/li>\n<li>Accelerate city gas distribution and PNG rollout to structurally reduce LPG import dependence.<\/li>\n<li>Diversify LPG sourcing further and build storage capacity to buffer choke-point disruptions.<\/li>\n<li>Make the under-recovery compensation mechanism transparent and predictable through explicit budgetary provisioning.<\/li>\n<li>Assess the inflationary impact of commercial LPG hikes on small food businesses before further cross-subsidisation.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">PMUY<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Under-recovery vs subsidy<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">PPAC &#038; PNGRB<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Import parity pricing<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Strait of Hormuz<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">City Gas Distribution<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">10M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> Examine how geopolitical disruption in West Asia transmits to household energy access in India, and evaluate the policy responses available to insulate consumers. (10 marks, 150 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: LPG pricing and policy<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Under-recovery refers to the difference between the price at which oil marketing companies sell a product and the price required to cover its cost.<\/li>\n<li>The Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell functions under the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas.<\/li>\n<li>The Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana provides free monthly cylinders to all rural households irrespective of income.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 PMUY provides deposit-free connections and a targeted per-cylinder subsidy to women from eligible poor households, not free cylinders to all rural households. Statements 1 and 2 are correct.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 14 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-14\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS2 \u2014 Elections &#038; Representation<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>Bypolls announced for 6 October; 13 lakh names deleted in Delhi before SIR began<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>The Election Commission announced byelections to five Assembly constituencies and one Lok Sabha seat on 6 October. In parallel, The Hindu&#8217;s analysis of Delhi Chief Electoral Officer data shows that 13.39 lakh names were deleted from the capital&#8217;s electoral rolls even before the Special Intensive Revision began, raising questions about notice and due process.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>The Byelections<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Schedule:<\/strong> Polling on <strong>6 October<\/strong>; nominations open until <strong>16 September<\/strong>; counting on <strong>9 October<\/strong>; process completed by <strong>11 October<\/strong>. The <strong>Model Code of Conduct<\/strong> comes into effect immediately in the districts encompassing the poll-bound constituencies.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Tamil Nadu:<\/strong> <strong>Madurantakam (SC)<\/strong> and <strong>Dharapuram (SC)<\/strong>, following the resignations of <strong>Maragatham Kumaravel<\/strong> and <strong>P. Sathyabama<\/strong>, both elected on AIADMK tickets in the 2026 Assembly polls, who resigned to join Chief Minister C. Joseph Vijay&#8217;s Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Puducherry:<\/strong> <strong>Thattanchavady<\/strong>, after the resignation of <strong>N. Rangasamy<\/strong>, who won from both Thattanchavady and Mangalam and gave up the former.<\/li>\n<li><strong>West Bengal:<\/strong> <strong>Rejinagar<\/strong> and the high-profile <strong>Nandigram<\/strong>, following the resignations of <strong>Humayun Kabir<\/strong> and Chief Minister <strong>Suvendu Adhikari<\/strong>, who retained Bhabanipur where he had defeated then incumbent Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. Mr. Kabir has offered the Rejinagar seat to Ms. Banerjee to contest.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Assam:<\/strong> The <strong>Nagaon Lok Sabha<\/strong> seat, following the resignation of <strong>Pradyut Bordoloi<\/strong>, who won on a Congress ticket in 2024, subsequently joined the BJP and won from Dispur in the Assembly polls.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Still vacant:<\/strong> <strong>Shillong<\/strong> (Meghalaya) and <strong>Basirhat<\/strong> (West Bengal) Lok Sabha seats, where polls have not been scheduled.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Delhi: Deletions Before the SIR<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The case:<\/strong> <strong>Pooja Devi, 38<\/strong>, has lived at the same address in Kalkaji for two decades. When the SIR began in June she received no enumeration form; when the draft roll was published, her name appeared neither in the roll nor in the list of those removed as absent, shifted, dead or duplicate. &#8220;My husband and children received their forms but I did not. I had also voted in the 2025 polls with them. My name is nowhere.&#8221;<\/li>\n<li><strong>The numbers:<\/strong> At the February 2025 Assembly elections, Delhi&#8217;s electorate stood at <strong>1.56 crore<\/strong>. By <strong>16 June<\/strong>, when the roll was frozen before the SIR, it had dropped to <strong>1.45 crore<\/strong> \u2014 a decrease of <strong>11.01 lakh names<\/strong>. After the SIR started, a further <strong>47.56 lakh names<\/strong> were deleted in the draft roll published on <strong>31 August<\/strong>. In total, <strong>37.6% \u2014 well over a third \u2014 of the voters on the 2025 roll are no longer part of Delhi&#8217;s electorate<\/strong>. The pre-SIR deletion figure is put at <strong>13.39 lakh<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The procedural question:<\/strong> Under ECI rules, continuous updation happens through individual applications for enrolment or objections, with BLO field verification required for unregistered deaths and shifting of voters, <strong>only after receiving Form-7<\/strong>. In all such cases, <strong>a notice must be issued<\/strong>. The Electoral Registration Officer can also delete <em>suo motu<\/em> based on the BLO&#8217;s field report. There is <strong>no draft roll or claims-and-objections period<\/strong> for such routine updating, unlike for special revisions.<\/li>\n<li><strong>No response:<\/strong> Delhi CEO <strong>Ashok Kumar<\/strong> and his office did not respond to queries, including whether notices were served on those deleted during the pre-SIR mapping exercise.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Mizoram SIR Outcome<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>78,442 names deleted<\/strong> and <strong>39,243 new electors added<\/strong>, taking the final voter count to <strong>8.35 lakh<\/strong>, per State CEO <strong>Garima Gupta<\/strong>. Before the SIR the State had <strong>8.75 lakh<\/strong> registered electors.<\/li>\n<li>The final roll recorded the State&#8217;s <strong>first third-gender elector<\/strong>, alongside <strong>4 lakh men and 4.32 lakh women<\/strong> voters.<\/li>\n<li>Of the enumeration forms distributed, <strong>8,28,906 were collected<\/strong> while <strong>46,162 were not<\/strong>, and those names were subsequently deleted.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background<\/h3>\n<p>Electoral rolls are prepared under the <strong>Representation of the People Act, 1950<\/strong>. <strong>Section 21(3)<\/strong> permits the ECI to order a special revision for reasons recorded in writing; <strong>Section 22<\/strong> governs correction and deletion of entries, and <strong>Section 23<\/strong> inclusion of names. <strong>Form 6<\/strong> is for new enrolment, <strong>Form 7<\/strong> for objection to inclusion or seeking deletion, and <strong>Form 8<\/strong> for corrections and shifting. The <strong>Registration of Electors Rules, 1960<\/strong> require notice and an opportunity of hearing before deletion. Byelections must ordinarily be held within <strong>six months<\/strong> of a vacancy arising, under Section 151A of the RP Act, 1951, subject to specified exceptions. <strong>Article 324<\/strong> vests superintendence, direction and control of elections in the ECI.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The pre-SIR deletions are the more serious concern:<\/strong> Special revision at least has a published draft roll and a claims-and-objections window. Routine updation has neither \u2014 so the 13.39 lakh removed before June are outside the protective architecture that surrounds the SIR itself.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Notice is the whole safeguard:<\/strong> The Registration of Electors Rules require it precisely because a citizen cannot contest what she does not know about. A voter whose name appears neither in the roll nor in any deletion list has no document to appeal against.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Scale demands explanation:<\/strong> A 37.6% reduction from the 2025 electorate is extraordinary. It may reflect genuine cleaning of a roll bloated by migration and duplication, or it may reflect wrongful exclusion \u2014 the absence of published category-wise data makes both readings equally available.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Migrant and informal workers are structurally vulnerable:<\/strong> A domestic worker at the same address for twenty years lacking a form illustrates that documentation intensity, not residence stability, determines who survives a revision.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Non-response by the CEO compounds the problem:<\/strong> An electoral authority&#8217;s legitimacy rests on procedural transparency. Declining to answer whether notices were issued converts an administrative question into a credibility question.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The byelections carry disproportionate political weight:<\/strong> Nandigram&#8217;s symbolism, and the resignations driven by defections in Tamil Nadu, mean these six seats will be read as sentiment indicators well beyond their number.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Publish category-wise deletion data for both the pre-SIR and SIR phases, with the reason recorded for each class of deletion.<\/li>\n<li>Ensure documented notice and an opportunity of hearing before every deletion, including in routine updation, as the Registration of Electors Rules require.<\/li>\n<li>Conduct a post-revision audit sampling deleted names to estimate wrongful exclusion, and publish the findings.<\/li>\n<li>Provide doorstep facilitation and legal aid for the elderly, disabled, migrant and informally employed during revision exercises.<\/li>\n<li>Make BLO field reports and their basis auditable, and publish helpline and grievance data.<\/li>\n<li>Fill the remaining Lok Sabha vacancies within the statutory six-month window or record reasons for the delay.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">RP Act 1950 \u2014 Sections 21, 22, 23<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Forms 6, 7 and 8<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Registration of Electors Rules 1960<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Section 151A \u2014 six-month rule<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Model Code of Conduct<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Booth Level Officer<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">15M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;Deletion from the electoral roll without notice is disenfranchisement by administrative default.&#8221; Examine the procedural safeguards governing revision of electoral rolls in India and assess whether they are adequately enforced. (15 marks, 250 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: Electoral roll procedure<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Form 6 is used for enrolment of a new elector, while Form 7 is used for objecting to the inclusion of a name or seeking deletion.<\/li>\n<li>The Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 require that an elector be given notice and an opportunity of hearing before deletion of her name.<\/li>\n<li>Under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, a byelection must ordinarily be held within one year of the occurrence of a vacancy.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 Section 151A prescribes six months, not one year, subject to specified exceptions such as a remainder of term of less than one year. Statements 1 and 2 are correct.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 15 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-15\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS3 \u2014 Climate Policy &#038; Trade<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>India&#8217;s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme receives U.K. CBAM recognition<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>In what officials describe as a major breakthrough, the United Kingdom has recognised India&#8217;s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme as a qualifying criterion for pricing relief under its carbon border adjustment mechanism \u2014 a move expected to reduce the tax burden on Indian exporters.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Background &#038; Key Facts<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The communication:<\/strong> Addressed to the <strong>Bureau of Energy Efficiency, Ministry of Power<\/strong>, the U.K.&#8217;s <strong>His Majesty&#8217;s Treasury<\/strong> confirmed that the <strong>CCTS<\/strong> has been included in the U.K.&#8217;s published <strong>indicative list of overseas carbon pricing schemes<\/strong> assessed as qualifying criteria under a provision of the <strong>Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (Calculation of CBAM Rate and Determination of Carbon Price Relief) Regulations 2026<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The effect:<\/strong> &#8220;This will reduce the effective CBAM liability on Indian goods, directly benefiting Indian exporters,&#8221; an official said.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background \u2014 Carbon Pricing and Border Adjustment<\/h3>\n<p>A <strong>Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism<\/strong> imposes a charge on the embedded carbon of imported goods equal to what a domestic producer would have paid under the importing country&#8217;s carbon price. Its stated purpose is to prevent <strong>carbon leakage<\/strong> \u2014 the relocation of emission-intensive production to jurisdictions with weaker climate policy. Critically, most CBAM designs allow a <strong>deduction for a carbon price already paid in the country of origin<\/strong>. That deduction is the mechanism at work here: recognition of the CCTS means the carbon price Indian producers pay domestically is netted off against the U.K. border charge, so the same tonne of carbon is not priced twice.<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-table-wrap\">\n<table>\n<tr>\n<th>Element<\/th>\n<th>Detail<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS)<\/td>\n<td>Notified under the Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2022; administered with the Bureau of Energy Efficiency as administrator<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Two mechanisms<\/td>\n<td>Compliance mechanism, with intensity-based emission targets for obligated entities; offset mechanism for voluntary projects<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Predecessors<\/td>\n<td>Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) scheme for energy efficiency; Renewable Energy Certificates<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Regulator<\/td>\n<td>Grid Controller of India as registry; CERC as market regulator; power exchanges for trading<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>EU CBAM<\/td>\n<td>Transitional reporting phase from October 2023; definitive financial obligations from 2026, covering iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Paris Agreement Article 6<\/td>\n<td>Framework for international cooperation and transfer of mitigation outcomes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Recognition validates the design, not just the diplomacy:<\/strong> For a foreign treasury to accept the CCTS as a qualifying carbon price, it must assess the scheme&#8217;s coverage, monitoring, reporting and verification integrity. That is a substantive endorsement of India&#8217;s carbon market architecture.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The relief is only as large as the carbon price:<\/strong> The deduction equals the price actually paid in India. If Indian carbon credit prices settle low \u2014 as intensity-based schemes with generous benchmarks often do \u2014 the offset against a higher U.K. price will be small in practice.<\/p>\n<p><strong>India&#8217;s negotiating position shifts:<\/strong> India has consistently objected to CBAM as a unilateral trade barrier inconsistent with CBDR-RC. Accepting relief through recognition is a pragmatic accommodation that partly concedes the mechanism&#8217;s legitimacy \u2014 a trade-off worth making for exporters, but one that weakens the principled objection.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The EU is the larger prize:<\/strong> The EU is a far bigger destination for Indian steel and aluminium than the U.K. Recognition by the U.K. creates a precedent and a template, but the commercially decisive negotiation remains with Brussels.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Domestic revenue versus foreign transfer:<\/strong> Every rupee of carbon price paid in India and credited against a foreign border levy is revenue retained domestically rather than transferred abroad \u2014 the strongest argument for accelerating the CCTS regardless of the trade dispute.<\/p>\n<p><strong>MRV capacity is the constraint:<\/strong> Exporters must now demonstrate embedded emissions at product level. Indian firms, particularly MSMEs in the value chain, largely lack the measurement systems to do so.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Pursue equivalent recognition of the CCTS by the European Union and other CBAM-adopting jurisdictions.<\/li>\n<li>Deepen the CCTS compliance market so that the domestic carbon price is meaningful enough to generate substantial relief.<\/li>\n<li>Build MRV capacity across exporting sectors, with special support for MSMEs in steel, aluminium and chemicals value chains.<\/li>\n<li>Continue advocating in the WTO and UNFCCC for CBDR-consistent treatment and technology and finance support for decarbonisation.<\/li>\n<li>Link CCTS design to decarbonisation investment \u2014 green steel, green hydrogen and efficiency retrofits \u2014 so compliance drives capability.<\/li>\n<li>Clarify the interface between CCTS credits, Article 6 transfers and domestic offset use to avoid double counting.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">Carbon Credit Trading Scheme<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act 2022<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Bureau of Energy Efficiency<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">PAT scheme<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">CBAM &#038; carbon leakage<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Paris Agreement Article 6<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">15M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;Carbon border adjustment mechanisms convert climate policy into trade policy.&#8221; Examine the implications for India, and assess whether recognition of India&#8217;s carbon market represents accommodation or capitulation. (15 marks, 250 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: Carbon markets<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements about India&#8217;s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>It was notified under the Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2022.<\/li>\n<li>The Bureau of Energy Efficiency functions as the administrator of the scheme.<\/li>\n<li>It replaced the Perform, Achieve and Trade scheme, which dealt with renewable energy purchase obligations.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 The PAT scheme dealt with energy efficiency improvement targets in designated consumers, trading Energy Saving Certificates; renewable purchase obligations were served by Renewable Energy Certificates. Statements 1 and 2 are correct.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 16 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-16\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS3 \u2014 Economy &#038; Statistical Governance<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>The GDP credibility debate: Garg&#8217;s critique and the CII business survey<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>Former Finance Secretary Subhash Chandra Garg has questioned the credibility of India&#8217;s latest GDP estimates, arguing that the sharp downward revisions to the size of the economy need a far more transparent explanation than the government&#8217;s invocation of new methodology. Separately, a CII survey finds that half of Indian businesses say the country&#8217;s strong macroeconomic performance has either not translated into improved business performance or has done so only partially.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Garg&#8217;s Critique \u2014 Key Points<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The missing bridge:<\/strong> The central concern is the absence of a transparent bridge between the <strong>2011-12 base series and the 2022-23 series<\/strong>. Mr. Garg said MoSPI must publish a <strong>back-series from 2011-12 to 2021-22<\/strong> and set a timetable for doing so; the absence of such a programme suggests the government is &#8220;not very serious&#8221; about resolving the issue.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The scale of revision:<\/strong> The revision in <strong>Q1 FY26<\/strong> is part of a much larger change, with GDP for <strong>2024-25 reduced by \u20b912.70 lakh crore<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The logical objection:<\/strong> The standard explanation \u2014 that a new series incorporates wider coverage, new data sources and indices \u2014 was insufficient in his view: <strong>&#8220;Any better coverage leads to nominal GDP getting increased, not decreased.&#8221;<\/strong><\/li>\n<li><strong>Two possibilities offered:<\/strong> Either the earlier system <strong>overstated GDP<\/strong> through errors such as double counting, or GDP was <strong>deliberately overstated<\/strong> to produce stronger growth numbers and later written down under cover of the new series. He gave no evidence of deliberate manipulation but said the scale of revision made a detailed explanation essential.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The deflator problem:<\/strong> With consumer inflation over <strong>4%<\/strong> and producer-price inflation about <strong>9%<\/strong>, the roughly <strong>2.5% GDP deflator<\/strong> implied by the latest numbers appeared difficult to reconcile \u2014 &#8220;There is definitely a serious internal inconsistency&#8221;. He called for the underlying price data to be disclosed and explained.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Double deflation:<\/strong> He was sceptical of applying double deflation to manufacturing, arguing international best practice cannot be transplanted without sufficiently granular Indian data, and suggested running the older system in parallel until the new methodology stabilises.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Statistical independence:<\/strong> India&#8217;s data infrastructure needs &#8220;massive modernisation&#8221;, but the system could still produce reliable numbers if there were no &#8220;political interest to produce results in a certain direction&#8221;. Statisticians need greater freedom from political control.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Beyond GDP:<\/strong> GDP is not a measure of welfare. India does not adequately publish the <strong>&#8220;income leg&#8221; of national accounts<\/strong> showing how value added is divided between labour, corporations and government. With per-capita GDP still low, he argued India must target <strong>9-10% growth<\/strong> while redistributing income more effectively and reducing unproductive government expenditure. He called the government&#8217;s explanation &#8220;officialese, obfuscatory&#8221; and said it &#8220;sheds no light&#8221;.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>The CII Business Outlook Survey<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Composite confidence:<\/strong> The index for <strong>July-September 2026<\/strong> rose to <strong>66 in Q2<\/strong> from <strong>60.8 in Q1 of FY27<\/strong> \u2014 the same as Q2 last year. The improvement was attributed to &#8220;easing of disruptions stemming from the West Asia conflict&#8221;. The survey covered <strong>238 public and private firms<\/strong> across all industry sectors and enterprise sizes.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The translation gap:<\/strong> <strong>13.4%<\/strong> said on-ground conditions were subdued despite strong macro data; <strong>36.6%<\/strong> said they saw some improvement &#8220;but weaker than indicators suggest&#8221;; <strong>11.3%<\/strong> said growth &#8220;matches or exceeds macro momentum&#8221;; and <strong>29.4%<\/strong> saw &#8220;clear benefits, though somewhat below headline growth&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Demand outlook:<\/strong> <strong>29.4%<\/strong> expect no change in local demand in Q2 versus Q1; <strong>3.5%<\/strong> expect demand more than 20% lower; <strong>6.1%<\/strong> expect 5-20% lower. But <strong>61% expect demand to rise<\/strong> against only <strong>9.6%<\/strong> foreseeing moderation. The share expecting demand growth above 20% rises from <strong>12.9% in Q1FY27 to 16% in Q2FY27<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background \u2014 India&#8217;s National Accounts<\/h3>\n<p>GDP estimates are compiled by the <strong>National Statistical Office<\/strong> under the <strong>Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation<\/strong>, with methodological oversight from the <strong>National Statistical Commission<\/strong> (a non-statutory body recommended by the Rangarajan Commission). Base year revisions are periodic; the 2011-12 series introduced the MCA-21 corporate database and shifted headline reporting to Gross Value Added at basic prices alongside GDP at market prices. A <strong>back series<\/strong> reconciles old and new bases so that long-run growth comparisons remain valid \u2014 and its absence has repeatedly been the focus of controversy. The <strong>GDP deflator<\/strong> is the implicit ratio of nominal to real GDP and is the broadest measure of economy-wide price change. <strong>Double deflation<\/strong> deflates inputs and outputs by separate price indices and is considered international best practice for measuring real value added in manufacturing; single deflation, long used in India, can distort real growth when input and output prices diverge.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The coverage argument is the strongest technical point:<\/strong> Broader coverage should ordinarily raise measured nominal output by capturing previously unrecorded activity. A downward revision therefore implies either correction of prior over-counting or a change in classification \u2014 either of which requires explicit documentation.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The deflator inconsistency deserves an answer:<\/strong> A 2.5% implicit deflator sitting between 4% consumer and 9% producer inflation is not impossible \u2014 weights and composition differ \u2014 but it is unusual enough that publishing the underlying price series is the obvious remedy.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Double deflation is genuinely better and genuinely data-hungry:<\/strong> Garg&#8217;s caution is methodologically sound. Adopting best practice without granular input price indices can substitute one distortion for another.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The credibility problem is cumulative:<\/strong> Successive controversies \u2014 the withheld back series, the delayed consumption survey, resignations from the NSC \u2014 mean each new revision is read against a history of contested transparency, regardless of its technical merit.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The CII data is the perception counterpart:<\/strong> Half of firms reporting that macro strength has not fully reached them can indicate either measurement error or a genuinely uneven recovery concentrated in large, formal, capital-intensive segments. Both readings are consistent with the same survey.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The income-side gap is the deeper point:<\/strong> Without published factor-income accounts, India cannot say how growth is distributed between wages, profits and taxes \u2014 which is precisely what determines whether headline growth is felt by households.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Publish a full back-series from 2011-12 to 2021-22 with a stated timetable and a documented reconciliation of the two bases.<\/li>\n<li>Release the underlying price indices and deflator methodology so that the implicit deflator can be independently verified.<\/li>\n<li>Run single and double deflation estimates in parallel until granular input price data is adequate.<\/li>\n<li>Strengthen the statutory independence and resourcing of the National Statistical Commission and the NSO.<\/li>\n<li>Publish factor-income accounts showing the division of value added between labour, capital and government.<\/li>\n<li>Improve the timeliness of household consumption and employment surveys so that GDP can be triangulated against welfare indicators.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">GDP deflator<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Double vs single deflation<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Gross Value Added at basic prices<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">National Statistical Commission<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">MCA-21 database<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Base year revision &#038; back series<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">15M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;A statistical system&#8217;s credibility rests less on its methods than on its transparency.&#8221; Examine the concerns raised over India&#8217;s revised GDP series and suggest reforms to strengthen statistical governance. (15 marks, 250 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: National income accounting<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>The GDP deflator is the ratio of nominal GDP to real GDP and covers all goods and services produced in the economy.<\/li>\n<li>Double deflation involves deflating output and intermediate inputs by separate price indices to obtain real value added.<\/li>\n<li>The National Statistical Commission is a statutory body constituted under an Act of Parliament.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 The National Statistical Commission was constituted by an executive resolution following the Rangarajan Commission&#8217;s recommendation and does not have statutory backing \u2014 a long-standing demand of statisticians. Statements 1 and 2 are correct.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 17 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-17\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS3 \u2014 Economy, Energy &#038; Environment<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>In a first, alternative fuel vehicles outsell petrol cars in India<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>For the first time in India, alternative fuels \u2014 CNG, hybrid and electric combined \u2014 overtook petrol in the passenger vehicle market, at 41.95% against petrol&#8217;s 40.85% in August 2026, according to Federation of Automobile Dealers Associations retail data.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Background &#038; Key Facts<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Overall:<\/strong> The industry retailed <strong>24,23,201 units<\/strong> in August 2026, up <strong>17.51% year-on-year<\/strong>, but down <strong>6.48% month-on-month<\/strong> due to the seasonal monsoon lull and a festival calendar that shifted Ganesh Chaturthi and pushed Onam-led buying into September.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Segment growth (YoY):<\/strong> Wheeled Construction Equipment <strong>31.45%<\/strong>, Two-wheelers <strong>19.69%<\/strong>, Passenger Vehicles <strong>16.14%<\/strong>, Commercial Vehicles <strong>14.45%<\/strong>, Three-wheelers <strong>8.64%<\/strong>, Tractors effectively flat at <strong>0.84%<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>FADA president Sai Giridhar:<\/strong> &#8220;Two-wheelers, passenger vehicles, commercial vehicles, tractors and three-wheelers each set fresh August records, and overall registrations were the highest ever for the month.&#8221;<\/li>\n<li><strong>Two-wheelers:<\/strong> <strong>17,14,610 units<\/strong>, up 19.69% YoY \u2014 the best August since 2018 \u2014 but down 5.70% MoM. Share of <strong>electric two-wheelers crossed 10% (10.68%)<\/strong> in a non-festival month for the first time, against 7.66% a year earlier.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Commercial vehicles:<\/strong> <strong>90,769 units<\/strong>, up 14.45% YoY (best-ever August), down 8.93% MoM. LCVs grew 15.32%, HCVs 13.98%, MCVs 10.38%, with dealers citing infrastructure execution, mining and e-commerce logistics alongside steady financing. <strong>Electric CV share rose to an all-time high of 5.18%<\/strong> from 2.06% a year ago.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Passenger vehicles:<\/strong> <strong>4,02,398 units<\/strong>, up 16.14% YoY \u2014 the first time the segment has crossed four lakh in an August \u2014 though MoM sales were 3.40% lower. The fuel mix: <strong>CNG 25.28%, Hybrid 9.04%, EV 7.63%<\/strong>, together <strong>41.95%<\/strong>, against petrol&#8217;s <strong>40.85%<\/strong>. Petrol nonetheless remains the single largest individual fuel.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The driver:<\/strong> &#8220;Dealers attribute the shift to running-cost economics and continuing consumer hesitation around the <strong>E20 transition<\/strong>, nudging petrol buyers towards CNG, hybrids and EVs,&#8221; Mr. Giridhar said.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Inventory warning:<\/strong> PV inventory rose by a further five days over July-end to about <strong>38-40 days<\/strong>, well above FADA&#8217;s recommended <strong>21-day benchmark<\/strong>, with <strong>56% of PV dealers<\/strong> reporting higher stock month-on-month.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Three-wheelers:<\/strong> EV penetration at <strong>65.30%<\/strong> \u2014 the segment &#8220;is now structurally electric&#8221;.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background<\/h3>\n<p>FADA reports <strong>retail registrations<\/strong> from the VAHAN portal, which measure actual sales to consumers, unlike SIAM&#8217;s <strong>wholesale dispatches<\/strong> from manufacturers to dealers \u2014 which is why the inventory-day figure is a leading indicator of dealer stress. The <strong>E20 programme<\/strong> mandates 20% ethanol blending in petrol, achieved ahead of the original 2030 target; consumer concerns relate to fuel efficiency and material compatibility in older vehicles. Electric mobility policy runs through the <strong>PM E-DRIVE<\/strong> scheme (successor to FAME-II), the <strong>PLI schemes<\/strong> for advanced chemistry cell batteries and automobiles, and State-level EV policies. CNG expansion depends on <strong>City Gas Distribution<\/strong> networks licensed by the <strong>PNGRB<\/strong>. India&#8217;s transport sector is a major contributor to oil imports and urban air pollution, giving the fuel-mix shift both energy security and public health significance.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The milestone is real but composite:<\/strong> Alternative fuels beat petrol only when CNG, hybrids and EVs are aggregated. CNG at 25.28% is the largest component, and CNG is a fossil fuel \u2014 cleaner on particulates and cheaper to run, but not a decarbonisation endpoint.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Running-cost economics, not climate preference, is driving the shift:<\/strong> The E20 hesitancy explanation is telling \u2014 consumers are moving away from petrol partly over efficiency and compatibility concerns, which means the shift is fragile and reversible if relative fuel prices change.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Three-wheelers show what structural transition looks like:<\/strong> At 65% EV penetration, the segment has crossed the point where electrification is the default \u2014 driven by high daily utilisation, low range requirements and favourable total cost of ownership. Passenger cars share none of those characteristics.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Inventory at 38-40 days is the warning sign:<\/strong> Nearly double the recommended benchmark, with over half of dealers reporting increases, indicates wholesale dispatches running ahead of retail demand \u2014 a classic precursor to discounting and dealer financial stress.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Diesel&#8217;s absence from the discussion is notable:<\/strong> The story frames the contest as alternative fuels versus petrol; diesel&#8217;s decline in passenger vehicles has already largely occurred.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Grid and charging remain the constraint:<\/strong> EV share at 7.63% in passenger vehicles, against 65% in three-wheelers, reflects charging infrastructure, upfront cost and range anxiety rather than consumer resistance to the technology.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Expand public charging infrastructure and battery-swapping standards to move passenger-vehicle EV adoption beyond early adopters.<\/li>\n<li>Address E20 compatibility concerns through transparent testing data and clear guidance for older vehicle owners.<\/li>\n<li>Monitor dealer inventory levels and align wholesale dispatch with retail demand to prevent channel stress.<\/li>\n<li>Expand City Gas Distribution networks so CNG availability matches demand outside metropolitan corridors.<\/li>\n<li>Scale domestic battery cell manufacturing under the PLI scheme and secure critical mineral supply chains.<\/li>\n<li>Treat CNG and hybrids as transition fuels within an explicit pathway to zero-tailpipe-emission mobility rather than as endpoints.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">FADA retail vs SIAM wholesale<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">VAHAN portal<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">E20 ethanol blending<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">PM E-DRIVE<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">PLI for ACC batteries<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">PNGRB &#038; City Gas Distribution<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">10M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;India&#8217;s automotive fuel transition is being driven by running-cost economics rather than climate policy.&#8221; Examine the implications of this for the durability of the shift away from petrol. (10 marks, 150 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: Automotive and fuel policy<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>FADA data reflects retail registrations of vehicles, while SIAM data reflects dispatches from manufacturers to dealers.<\/li>\n<li>The E20 programme refers to blending of 20% ethanol in petrol.<\/li>\n<li>Compressed Natural Gas is classified as a renewable fuel under India&#8217;s energy policy.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 CNG is a fossil fuel, cleaner burning than petrol or diesel but not renewable; compressed biogas (CBG) is the renewable analogue. Statements 1 and 2 are correct.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 18 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-18\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS3 \u2014 Environment &#038; Industry<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>Green steel: India can cut emissions before coal plants lock them in<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>A slew of announcements has placed steel sector decarbonisation high on the agenda, including a \u20b95,000-crore scheme to accelerate it, set to launch in the coming months. Research suggests India has a narrow window to redirect planned investment away from coal-based steelmaking before new blast furnaces lock in emissions for decades.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Background &#038; Key Facts<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>India&#8217;s position:<\/strong> Steelmaking emissions are among the highest in the world, roughly <strong>32% higher than the global average<\/strong>, and account for nearly <strong>12% of India&#8217;s total greenhouse gas emissions<\/strong>. Steel production in FY 2025-26 was the <strong>second-highest in the world at around 160 million tonnes<\/strong>, behind only China.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The Mission target:<\/strong> The <strong>National Mission on Green Steel<\/strong> aims to lower emissions intensity from the current <strong>2.55-2.65 to 2.2 tonnes of CO\u2082-equivalent per tonne of crude steel by 2029-30<\/strong>. A certification scheme launched in <strong>2024<\/strong> defines steel below <strong>2.2 tCO\u2082e<\/strong> as &#8220;green&#8221;, with the greenest tier still up to <strong>1.6 tCO\u2082e<\/strong>. Globally, average steelmaking emissions are around <strong>1.85 tCO\u2082e<\/strong> \u2014 so India&#8217;s greenest steel remains highly carbon-intensive.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The scrap constraint:<\/strong> <strong>Anubha Aggarwal<\/strong> of the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air: &#8220;India is a developing economy, and we do not have much scrap available. If we have old steel available, we can recycle that scrap to produce new steel, which reduces our costs and emissions associated with reducing iron ore.&#8221;<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>The Technology Pathways<\/h3>\n<div class=\"lias-table-wrap\">\n<table>\n<tr>\n<th>Route<\/th>\n<th>Process<\/th>\n<th>Emissions profile<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>BF-BOF<\/strong> (blast furnace\u2013basic oxygen furnace)<\/td>\n<td>Coking coal strips oxygen from iron ore in a blast furnace; the carbon-rich liquid is treated with pure oxygen in a basic oxygen furnace<\/td>\n<td>Highly carbon-intensive; <strong>70.4% of global steelmaking<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>EAF<\/strong> (electric arc furnace)<\/td>\n<td>Electricity melts scrap or direct reduced iron<\/td>\n<td>Less than half the emissions intensity of BF-BOF steel<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>DRI-EAF with green hydrogen<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Hydrogen instead of natural gas reduces iron ore; clean electricity powers the furnace<\/td>\n<td>Near-zero (excluding scope-3); natural gas route still emits ~1.2 tCO\u2082 per tonne<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Electric induction furnace<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Electromagnetic fields process small batches of scrap or DRI<\/td>\n<td>Energy-efficient<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table><\/div>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>India&#8217;s mix:<\/strong> Per an India Steel Association report, <strong>43% of crude steel is produced at BF-BOF plants, 22% from EAF units, and 35% from electric induction furnaces<\/strong>. Given growing demand and planned plants, <strong>BF-BOF capacity is projected to increase to 56% by 2030<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The window:<\/strong> <strong>Clara Bachorz<\/strong> of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, lead author of a paper in <em>Nature Climate Change<\/em>, argues India has a large opportunity to become a major green steel and iron producer if it invests in greener pathways rather than coal-based steel. Avoiding new BF-BOFs and not relining young furnaces due for it, while diverting investment to EAFs, &#8220;could almost halve global committed steel emissions&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Just a redirection:<\/strong> &#8220;We find that since the majority of these BOF plants in India have not broken ground, you could redirect investments already towards DRI-EAF, and this would not require additional investments. It would just be a redirection.&#8221;<\/li>\n<li><strong>The relining deadline:<\/strong> Relining a blast furnace is a capital-intensive maintenance task done roughly every two decades that extends plant life by another <strong>15-20 years<\/strong> \u2014 while locking in coal-based production for that period. More than <strong>43 million tonnes per annum<\/strong> of blast furnace capacity is due for relining before <strong>2030<\/strong>, per Reclimatize.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The two scenarios:<\/strong> Bachorz et al. modelled global transition pathways aligned with 1.5\u00b0C with overshoot up to 1.7\u00b0C, finding China and India dominate the fast-transition dynamics. In the <strong>slow-transition scenario<\/strong>, young furnaces are relined and announced plants proceed, locking in emissions and relying far more on nascent carbon dioxide removal technologies.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The hydrogen timeline:<\/strong> Per the model, India first operates DRI-EAF plants primarily with <strong>natural gas until 2040-2045<\/strong>, then switches to hydrogen as green hydrogen becomes cost-competitive.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The reframing:<\/strong> Steel is &#8220;less a &#8216;hard-to-abate&#8217; sector than a sector facing a &#8216;hard-to-abate barrier&#8217; that can be overcome at relatively moderate costs through timely investment decisions&#8221;. Compared with aviation, &#8220;it is relatively much easier to abate because the technology is already there, even though it is more expensive&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The stranded asset argument:<\/strong> Ms. Aggarwal: &#8220;If we invest in EAF now, it would be much easier for us to make it cleaner later rather than investing in BF-BOF now and it becoming a stranded property later&#8230; We have already seen this with thermal power plants, where it becomes really difficult to close them down.&#8221;<\/li>\n<li><strong>Caveat on gas:<\/strong> Natural gas-based EAFs carry risks of fuel shortages, import dependence, geopolitical shocks and stranded gas infrastructure.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Policy and Market Developments<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>CBAM pressure:<\/strong> The EU&#8217;s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism came into effect in January, imposing steep penalties on carbon-intensive imports including Indian steel. India has been seeking alternative markets and boosting domestic consumption, while compliance obligations force rethinking of investment decisions.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Green hydrogen pilots:<\/strong> In March, the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy funded <strong>three pilot green hydrogen projects totalling more than \u20b9400 crore<\/strong> to validate the feasibility of using 100% green hydrogen in furnaces.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Commercial scale:<\/strong> <strong>JSW Energy<\/strong> commissioned India&#8217;s largest commercial-scale green hydrogen plant at <strong>Vijayanagar, Karnataka<\/strong>, supplying 100% green hydrogen to the adjoining JSW Steel DRI unit.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Certification:<\/strong> <strong>ArcelorMittal Nippon Steel India<\/strong> became the first integrated steel producer to receive green steel certification in <strong>February<\/strong>. Per government data, <strong>89 steel units<\/strong> had received the certification as of <strong>31 March<\/strong>, covering a production volume of <strong>12.34 million tonnes<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The demand gap:<\/strong> Ms. Aggarwal: &#8220;You may have your doubts about whether [India&#8217;s &#8216;green steel&#8217;] is really green, and the brackets for green steel certification are too large not to be very effective, but then at the end of the day, we have taken that initiative of defining what &#8216;green steel&#8217; is, unlike anywhere else in the world&#8230; What we have not done is create the kind of market where there is also demand for green steel.&#8221;<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The relining window is the decisive policy moment:<\/strong> 43 MTPA due for relining before 2030 represents a one-time choice. Reline, and coal-based emissions are locked for 15-20 years; redirect, and the same capital builds a lower-carbon asset. Windows of this kind do not reopen.<\/p>\n<p><strong>&#8220;Just a redirection&#8221; understates the difficulty:<\/strong> The capital sum may be similar, but the supply chain, skills, power procurement, gas or hydrogen contracts and iron ore quality requirements differ substantially. Redirection is cheap on a spreadsheet and hard in an industrial plan.<\/p>\n<p><strong>India&#8217;s green steel threshold is generous:<\/strong> Defining green as below 2.2 tCO\u2082e when the global average is 1.85 means Indian &#8220;green&#8221; steel can be more carbon-intensive than ordinary steel elsewhere \u2014 a definition that risks failing to satisfy CBAM assessors while diluting the domestic signal.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Certification without demand is a label:<\/strong> Ninety units certified but no green procurement mandate means no price premium and therefore no investment case. Demand creation, through public procurement and mandated green content, is the missing instrument.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The scrap constraint is structural, not temporary:<\/strong> A young building stock and low per-capita steel accumulation mean India will lack scrap for decades \u2014 so India&#8217;s EAF route depends on DRI, and therefore on gas or hydrogen, not on recycling.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Gas as a bridge carries the thermal-power risk:<\/strong> Committing to gas-based DRI until 2040-45 creates the same lock-in dynamic that green steel advocates warn against for coal, with added import-dependence and geopolitical exposure demonstrated during the Hormuz disruption.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Institute a moratorium or strict appraisal on new BF-BOF capacity and on relining of young blast furnaces, with incentives to redirect to DRI-EAF.<\/li>\n<li>Tighten the green steel certification threshold progressively towards and below the global average so the label carries international credibility.<\/li>\n<li>Create demand through green public procurement mandates for infrastructure, railways and defence, and green content requirements in construction.<\/li>\n<li>Scale green hydrogen under the National Green Hydrogen Mission with dedicated offtake for steel, and support electrolyser manufacturing.<\/li>\n<li>Secure clean power supply and grid access for EAF operations, since EAF emissions depend entirely on the electricity mix.<\/li>\n<li>Build a domestic scrap collection and processing ecosystem under vehicle scrappage and construction demolition policies for the long run.<\/li>\n<li>Negotiate CBAM treatment leveraging the CCTS recognition precedent, linking market access to demonstrated decarbonisation.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">BF-BOF vs EAF vs DRI<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">National Mission on Green Steel<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Green steel taxonomy (2.2 tCO\u2082e)<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">National Green Hydrogen Mission<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">CBAM<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">15M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;Steel is not a hard-to-abate sector but a sector facing a hard-to-abate investment barrier.&#8221; Critically examine India&#8217;s opportunity to decarbonise steelmaking before new coal-based capacity locks in emissions. (15 marks, 250 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: Steel decarbonisation<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>The blast furnace\u2013basic oxygen furnace route uses coking coal to reduce iron ore and is the dominant global steelmaking method.<\/li>\n<li>Electric arc furnaces can produce steel from scrap or direct reduced iron and have lower emissions intensity than the BF-BOF route.<\/li>\n<li>The emissions intensity of steel produced through an electric arc furnace is independent of the source of electricity used.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 EAF emissions depend heavily on the electricity mix; an EAF powered by coal-fired generation delivers far smaller savings than one powered by renewables. Statements 1 and 2 are correct.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 19 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-19\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS3 \u2014 Technology, Energy &#038; Water<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>Can air-cooling handle the heat from a 1-GW data centre?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>Following sustained local protests and pressure from civil society groups, Google has reportedly said its planned 1-GW data centre in Visakhapatnam district will use air-cooling technology to cool its servers. Air-cooling requires less water \u2014 but comes with its own trade-offs, and cannot practically handle the heat load of a 1-GW facility on its own.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Why Data Centres Generate Heat<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>A large data centre has several million processors, each with billions of transistors. As a transistor manipulates current, the resistance of its material releases heat, as does charging and discharging. Across trillions of transistors, the heat is considerable.<\/li>\n<li><strong>A 1-GW data centre will in principle produce 1 GW of heat.<\/strong> The planned Google &#8220;hyperscaler&#8221; near Visakhapatnam and the newly announced <strong>Tata Consultancy Services &#8220;HyperVault&#8221;<\/strong> will each be 1-GW facilities.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The architecture:<\/strong> Billions of transistors make a processor; processors make a server; servers fill a rack; racks combine into clusters; clusters make a data centre.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Cooling Technologies Compared<\/h3>\n<div class=\"lias-table-wrap\">\n<table>\n<tr>\n<th>Technology<\/th>\n<th>Mechanism<\/th>\n<th>Trade-off<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Air-cooling<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Fans push cool air through or around racks; hot air is collected and cooled. Configurations: computer-room ACs (CRACs), computer-room air-handlers (CRAHs), hot-aisle\/cold-aisle containment, free-cooling, rear-door heat exchangers<\/td>\n<td>Low water use, low upfront cost, mature; but limited heat removal capacity<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Direct liquid cooling (cold plate)<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>A metal plate with channels carrying liquid is placed against the processor; liquid draws heat to a heat-exchanger<\/td>\n<td>More effective \u2014 water-based liquids have higher heat capacity than air for the same volume \u2014 but higher upfront cost<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Immersion cooling<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Electronics immersed in a non-conductive liquid; single-phase (pumped away) or two-phase (liquid boils, vapour condenses)<\/td>\n<td>Handles very high power densities; requires specialised hardware and complex coolant maintenance<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Evaporative cooling<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Heat transferred to water, which evaporates in cooling towers<\/td>\n<td>Highly energy-efficient in dry air; requires large quantities of water<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Dry-cooling<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Heat-exchanger exposed to ambient air with large fins<\/td>\n<td>Avoids water demand; needs larger heat-exchange surfaces, especially in warm climates<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Others<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Chilled-water systems; geothermal heat rejection (experimental); natural water cooling using a lake; heat reuse for industry or desalination<\/td>\n<td>Geothermal hard to scale; heat reuse difficult without heat pumps since the heat must usually be at a higher temperature to be useful<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>The Limits of Air-Cooling<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Cost comparison:<\/strong> Current construction benchmarks suggest liquid-cooled facilities incur a <strong>7-10% premium on total project cost<\/strong> due to complex piping, leak detection and coolant distribution units.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Where air works:<\/strong> Air-cooling is proven, with a deep pool of technicians and maintenance protocols. Engineers often prefer to air-cool racks producing <strong>20 kW or less<\/strong>. In naturally cool or arid conditions, <strong>air-side economisers can reduce energy diverted to mechanical cooling by 70%<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The thermal wall:<\/strong> As of 2026, using air-cooling alone for a 1-GW data centre is considered impractical, physically and economically. <strong>Air-cooling can remove at best around 40 kW per rack.<\/strong> Modern AI chips like the <strong>Nvidia Blackwell<\/strong> generate <strong>700-1,000 W per GPU<\/strong>, so a rack could emit <strong>120-150 kW<\/strong>. At that scale, air-cooling would require racks installed inside a wind tunnel, with power consumption skyrocketing.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Acoustic impact:<\/strong> Air-cooling chillers and air-handling units can produce up to <strong>100 dB<\/strong>; if the resulting low-frequency hum is not dampened it can travel several kilometres under favourable atmospheric conditions, disturbing residents.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The practical answer \u2014 hybrid cooling:<\/strong> Many 1-GW facilities use air-cooling for low-density servers and other areas, <strong>rear-door heat exchangers to push air-cooling to 50 kW<\/strong>, and <strong>direct-to-chip (DTC) liquid cooling<\/strong> for high-density AI clusters.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The framing:<\/strong> While liquid-cooling imposes higher costs upfront, <strong>air-cooling levies a performance and efficiency tax<\/strong> that can increase the total cost of ownership within a few years of operation.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>What the Companies Have Committed To<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Google:<\/strong> Visakhapatnam MP <strong>M. Sribharat<\/strong> said Google confirmed it will use air-cooling technology and that &#8220;there is no question of impact to water supply&#8221;. Google has said it will <strong>replenish 120% of water consumed for non-cooling needs<\/strong> across its operations by <strong>2030<\/strong>, quantified under the <strong>Volumetric Water Benefit Accounting<\/strong> standard. It is also planning integrated watershed-management measures including <strong>rainwater catchment on data-centre buildings, groundwater recharge infrastructure, water pumps and water ATMs<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>TCS HyperVault:<\/strong> CEO <strong>Deepesh Kiran Nanda<\/strong>: &#8220;We are building infrastructure for where AI is going: higher density, liquid cooling, larger power blocks, and faster deployment.&#8221; The facility will feature <strong>DTC cooling<\/strong> and use <strong>renewable energy<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>&#8220;Air-cooling&#8221; as a public commitment may be technically incomplete:<\/strong> If a 1-GW facility hosting AI clusters cannot be air-cooled alone, then the assurance given to protesters describes part of a hybrid system rather than the whole. Communities are entitled to the full cooling design, not a headline.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Water is the visible concern; power is the larger one:<\/strong> A gigawatt of continuous demand in a State with a constrained grid raises questions about generation adequacy, transmission investment and the emissions of the marginal unit supplying it \u2014 questions that the water debate has crowded out.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Water replenishment is not water non-use:<\/strong> A commitment to replenish 120% of water for non-cooling needs is measured at the corporate portfolio level over time; it does not guarantee that the specific local aquifer or supply system is unaffected during operation.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Noise is an under-regulated externality:<\/strong> A 100 dB source with low-frequency propagation over kilometres is a genuine public health issue, and Indian ambient noise standards for industrial areas were not designed for this class of continuous emitter.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Heat reuse is the missed opportunity:<\/strong> A gigawatt of low-grade heat could serve desalination, district heating or industrial processes. Locating hyperscale facilities without planning for heat reuse discards a large energy resource.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Civil society pressure worked, partially:<\/strong> The episode shows local mobilisation can change corporate disclosure and design. The lesson for regulators is that mandatory upfront disclosure of water, power and noise footprints would achieve the same result without requiring protest.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Mandate disclosure of Power Usage Effectiveness and Water Usage Effectiveness, and full cooling architecture, in environmental clearance documents for hyperscale data centres.<\/li>\n<li>Require independent hydrological assessment of local water availability and aquifer impact before siting approval.<\/li>\n<li>Set noise standards and mandatory acoustic mitigation for continuous industrial cooling infrastructure near residential areas.<\/li>\n<li>Require or incentivise renewable power procurement and grid impact assessment for gigawatt-scale loads.<\/li>\n<li>Encourage heat-reuse planning \u2014 desalination, industrial process heat \u2014 in siting decisions and industrial park design.<\/li>\n<li>Frame a national data centre policy integrating land, power, water, cooling and community consultation requirements.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">PUE &#038; WUE<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Direct-to-chip liquid cooling<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Evaporative vs dry cooling<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Air-side economisers<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Volumetric Water Benefit Accounting<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">15M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;Hyperscale data centres are simultaneously an economic opportunity and an energy, water and land governance challenge.&#8221; Examine the regulatory framework India requires as AI infrastructure scales. (15 marks, 250 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: Data centre cooling<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Liquid cooling is generally more effective than air cooling because water-based liquids have a higher heat capacity than air for the same volume.<\/li>\n<li>Evaporative cooling reduces water consumption compared with dry cooling.<\/li>\n<li>Air-cooling alone is considered impractical for removing the heat load of very high-density AI compute racks.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (c)<\/b> \u2014 Evaporative cooling requires large quantities of water; dry cooling exists precisely to avoid that demand, so statement 2 is inverted. Statements 1 and 3 are correct.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 20 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-20\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS2 \u00b7 GS3 \u2014 Public Health &#038; Regulation<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>Are nicotine pouches beyond the law?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>A study led by the ICMR-National Institute of Cancer Prevention and Research has found that nicotine pouches are reaching Indian cities through online platforms, hookah shops and gig delivery services. The study follows a WHO warning in May 2026 about the dangers these products pose \u2014 yet it remains far from settled which Indian law, if any, governs them.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>What They Are, and the Regulatory Gap<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The product:<\/strong> A nicotine pouch is a small, <strong>tobacco-free<\/strong>, tea-bag-like sack containing nicotine, flavourings and plant-based fibres. Users place it between the lip and gum for up to an hour, allowing nicotine absorption directly into the bloodstream <strong>without smoke, vapour or spitting<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>COTPA does not cover them:<\/strong> The <strong>Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act, 2003<\/strong> governs marketing, advertising and sale of cigarettes and other tobacco products, but its definition of tobacco products does not extend to all products containing nicotine. Restrictions on freedom of trade and commerce must be strictly construed, and since nicotine pouches are not among the products listed, they fall outside COTPA.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The Drugs Act is debatable:<\/strong> Nicotine is not listed as a drug in any schedule of the <strong>Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940<\/strong>. However, nicotine patches and gums have been approved as drugs by the <strong>Drug Controller General of India<\/strong> for therapeutic use in treating nicotine addiction, and <strong>Schedule K of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945<\/strong> lists gums and lozenges, exempting them from licensing and prescription requirements if they contain <strong>less than 2 mg of nicotine<\/strong>. The argument runs both ways: if nicotine were not a drug at all, there would be no reason to exempt certain nicotine products in Schedule K \u2014 but pouches make no therapeutic claim and do not purport to treat addiction, being a substitute for cigarettes, so on that reading they do not qualify as drugs.<\/li>\n<li><strong>PECA does not apply:<\/strong> The <strong>Prohibition of Electronic Cigarettes Act, 2019<\/strong> bans the import and sale of vapes. If vapes were drugs, no separate legislation would have been needed \u2014 the enactment of PECA suggests the Drugs Act did not give adequate power. Nicotine pouches differ from vapes: they contain <strong>no electronic device and produce neither smoke nor vapour<\/strong>, and are consequently not covered by PECA.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Could they be food?<\/strong> The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the <strong>Food Safety and Standards Act<\/strong> define food broadly as any processed, partially processed or unprocessed substance intended for human consumption. Court rulings on <strong>supari and chewing tobacco<\/strong> establish that the definition has very wide amplitude, encompassing items chewed rather than swallowed \u2014 so it is arguable that nicotine pouches fall within it.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Import, Customs and Duty-Free<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Two statutes govern imports:<\/strong> The <strong>Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992<\/strong> empowers the Central government to prohibit, restrict or regulate imports, administered by the <strong>DGFT<\/strong> which publishes the <strong>ITC-HS classification<\/strong> listing goods as free, restricted or banned. <strong>Section 11 of the Customs Act, 1962<\/strong> allows prohibition of goods wholly or partly by notification, on grounds including protection of human, animal or plant life.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The new customs codes:<\/strong> After the <strong>World Customs Organization<\/strong> updated the Harmonized System, a sub-category was introduced for oral nicotine products not involving combustion \u2014 <strong>2404 91 30<\/strong> covers tobacco-free single-use pouches of the Zyn or Lyft type, and <strong>2404 91 90<\/strong> covers other oral nicotine products not meant for therapeutic uses. Under the DGFT schedule and CBIC rules, goods under <strong>2404 91 30 are &#8220;restricted&#8221;<\/strong> \u2014 they cannot be cleared merely on payment of duty, and unlike prohibited e-cigarettes they are not banned outright, but require a <strong>specific licence or permission<\/strong>, with the DGFT cross-referencing the health and other ministries.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Duty-free shops:<\/strong> Nicotine pouches are currently available at a few duty-free stores at Indian airports, licensed under <strong>Section 58 of the Customs Act<\/strong>. In <strong>Flemingo Duty Free Shop Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Kaushik Bhattacharya (2024)<\/strong>, the Calcutta High Court held that a duty-free store did not &#8220;import&#8221; goods into India, being deemed located outside it for Customs Act purposes, so legal metrology labelling requirements did not apply. The author cautions this should not be read as meaning no Indian law applies \u2014 otherwise, could stores stock arms and ammunition, and which court or police station would have jurisdiction over a crime committed there? Permitted duty-free goods include cigarettes, alcohol, jewellery, watches, food and small electronics; nicotine pouches are not among them unless one argues they are food.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The remedy:<\/strong> &#8220;The legal position is intricate, but the remedy is not.&#8221; A notification under the Customs Act and the Foreign Trade Act banning import and sale on health grounds &#8220;would take minutes to issue&#8221;. If the government moves as slowly as it did with vapes, pouches will become fashionable and demand will settle in \u2014 and a ban notified after that point will only produce smuggling on the scale now seen with vapes.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background<\/h3>\n<p>India is a party to the <strong>WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)<\/strong>, which obliges parties to regulate the contents, packaging, advertising and sale of tobacco products and to protect public health policy from tobacco industry interference. Domestic instruments include <strong>COTPA 2003<\/strong> (advertising ban, pictorial warnings, prohibition of sale to minors and near educational institutions), the <strong>food safety regulations banning gutka and pan masala containing tobacco or nicotine<\/strong> in most States, and <strong>PECA 2019<\/strong>. The public health concern with nicotine pouches is that they deliver a highly addictive substance with youth-friendly flavouring and no smoke, sidestepping the visual and social cues that tobacco control has relied on \u2014 a classic case of regulation defined by product category rather than by the harmful agent.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The gap is definitional, not accidental:<\/strong> Indian tobacco law regulates <em>tobacco<\/em>; a tobacco-free nicotine product escapes it by design. Product innovation outpacing category-based regulation is the recurring pattern \u2014 vapes needed a fresh statute for the same reason.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The vape precedent is the strongest argument for speed:<\/strong> Prohibition after a market establishes itself produces smuggling, not abstinence. The lesson from PECA is that timing determines whether a ban is enforceable.<\/p>\n<p><strong>&#8220;Restricted&#8221; is a policy choice already made and not exercised:<\/strong> Classification under 2404 91 30 means the DGFT already has the power to refuse licences. Availability at duty-free stores suggests either licences have been granted or the restriction is not being enforced at the point of sale.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The food classification route is a double-edged remedy:<\/strong> Treating pouches as food would bring them under FSSAI, which has already banned tobacco and nicotine in food products in many States \u2014 a fast route to prohibition, but one that legitimises the product as food if the ban is not applied.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The duty-free extraterritoriality argument deserves the scepticism it gets:<\/strong> A legal fiction created for customs valuation cannot be extended into a general immunity from Indian law, as the arms-and-ammunition reductio demonstrates.<\/p>\n<p><strong>A ban is not the only option:<\/strong> Some jurisdictions permit regulated nicotine pouches as a harm-reduction alternative for adult smokers, with flavour restrictions, nicotine caps and age verification. India&#8217;s blanket-prohibition instinct forecloses that debate, though the youth-uptake evidence supports caution.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Issue a notification under the Customs Act and the Foreign Trade Act on health grounds before demand becomes established, as the author recommends.<\/li>\n<li>Amend COTPA to regulate by the harmful agent \u2014 nicotine \u2014 rather than by product category, closing the definitional loophole permanently.<\/li>\n<li>Enforce the existing &#8220;restricted&#8221; classification at duty-free shops and at online and courier import points.<\/li>\n<li>Direct enforcement at online platforms and gig delivery services identified in the ICMR study as distribution channels.<\/li>\n<li>Fund surveillance of youth nicotine uptake and run targeted awareness campaigns on non-combustible nicotine products.<\/li>\n<li>Strengthen tobacco and nicotine cessation services so that regulation is paired with support for existing users.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">COTPA 2003<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">PECA 2019<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Drugs and Cosmetics Act \u2014 Schedule K<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">FTDR Act 1992 &#038; ITC-HS<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Customs Act Section 11 &#038; 58<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">WHO FCTC<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">15M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;India&#8217;s tobacco control law regulates products rather than the addictive agent, leaving it perpetually one innovation behind.&#8221; Examine with reference to the regulatory status of nicotine pouches. (15 marks, 250 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: Nicotine product regulation<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>The Prohibition of Electronic Cigarettes Act, 2019 bans the production, import, sale and advertisement of electronic cigarettes in India.<\/li>\n<li>The Directorate General of Foreign Trade publishes the ITC-HS classification specifying whether goods are free, restricted or prohibited for import.<\/li>\n<li>The Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act, 2003 covers all products containing nicotine, whether or not they contain tobacco.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 COTPA&#8217;s definition extends to tobacco products, not to all nicotine-containing products \u2014 which is precisely the regulatory gap that tobacco-free nicotine pouches exploit. Statements 1 and 2 are correct.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 21 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-21\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">GS2 \u2014 Judiciary, Rights &#038; Administration<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>Supreme Court round-up: doctors, the Aravallis, senior citizens and the Civil Services limbo<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>Four significant developments from the Supreme Court and its consequences appear in today&#8217;s edition \u2014 on violence against doctors, the deadline for defining the Aravallis, facilities for senior citizens, and the service allocation limbo affecting 958 recommended Civil Services candidates.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>1. Violence Against Doctors<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The observation:<\/strong> A Bench of <strong>Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta<\/strong> said those who assault doctors and hospital staff &#8220;do not deserve to roam on the streets even for a minute&#8221;, prompting a Maharashtra corporator to withdraw his plea after the Bench indicated it could examine cancellation of his bail.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The case:<\/strong> Shiv Sena corporator <strong>Ramesh Sukrya Mhatre<\/strong> challenged the Bombay High Court&#8217;s <strong>18 July<\/strong> order staying his bail and its <strong>7 August<\/strong> order imposing conditions including remaining outside Maharashtra until trial. The case stems from an alleged assault on <strong>6 July<\/strong> on three doctors at the Kalyan Dombivli Municipal Corporation-run <strong>Shastri Nagar Hospital, Dombivli, Thane<\/strong>, after they advised that a pregnant woman be shifted because all NICU beds were occupied.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The pattern:<\/strong> The court referred to an incident in <strong>Palghar on 5 September<\/strong> where 17 Shiv Sena workers were booked for allegedly assaulting hospital staff after a dispute over treatment of a 19-year-old injured during a Dahi Handi celebration. &#8220;There appeared to be a propensity to do these things.&#8221;<\/li>\n<li><strong>Outcome:<\/strong> Senior advocate <strong>Mukul Rohatgi<\/strong> sought withdrawal; Justice Nath said a larger message was needed. The Bench issued notice on the Maharashtra government&#8217;s appeal challenging bail, listed for <strong>28 September<\/strong>, and allowed withdrawal of Mr. Mhatre&#8217;s petition. The High Court had also directed the State to provide adequate protection to the three doctors.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>2. The Aravalli Definition Panel<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The refusal:<\/strong> Rejecting a six-month extension sought by the Supreme Court-appointed high-powered committee, CJI <strong>Surya Kant<\/strong> asked whether it was &#8220;waiting for his retirement&#8221; \u2014 he demits office on <strong>9 February 2027<\/strong>. &#8220;They should have clearly asked for a date after my retirement&#8230; We are not going to allow this.&#8221;<\/li>\n<li><strong>The deadline:<\/strong> The panel must submit its final report by <strong>30 November<\/strong>. The Bench, also comprising Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana, made clear no further extension would be granted and directed the five-member panel, headed by Indian Council of Forestry Research and Education Director General <strong>Kanchan Devi<\/strong>, to &#8220;work day and night&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The mandate:<\/strong> Evolving a <strong>uniform definition of the ecologically fragile Aravalli hills and range<\/strong> and recommending measures to regulate future mining. The court asked for interim reports on issues requiring immediate consideration and directed the panel to hear all stakeholders, including tribal communities in Rajasthan and Gujarat. Next hearing: <strong>2 December<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>3. Facilities for Senior Citizens<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>A three-judge Bench headed by CJI Surya Kant directed <strong>all States and Union Territories to file fresh status reports<\/strong> detailing the number of old-age homes and facilities available to senior citizens across the country, within <strong>four weeks<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>Attorney General <strong>R. Venkataramani<\/strong> was asked to communicate the direction to Advocates General and standing counsel.<\/li>\n<li>The Bench was hearing a <strong>2016 public interest litigation<\/strong> filed by former Union Minister and senior advocate <strong>Ashwini Kumar<\/strong> concerning the welfare of senior citizens, particularly those without adequate shelter, food or medical care.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>4. Civil Services Candidates in Limbo<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The situation:<\/strong> The <strong>958 candidates<\/strong> recommended by the UPSC in the <strong>2025 Civil Services Examination<\/strong> are in limbo over service allocation and the start of their foundation course, which was expected to begin in August.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The cause:<\/strong> The Centre applied to the Supreme Court seeking permission for the <strong>DoPT<\/strong> to allocate services <strong>without implementing the court&#8217;s 11 March <em>Rohith Nathan<\/em> judgment<\/strong>. That ruling found the DoPT was incorrectly excluding certain OBC candidates from reservation by concluding they belonged to the creamy layer <strong>based only on their parents&#8217; salary income<\/strong>, and directed corrective measures within six months. CSE 2025 results were declared on <strong>6 March<\/strong>, days before the judgment.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The wait:<\/strong> The Supreme Court is set to hear the Centre on <strong>17 September<\/strong>. Candidates report no communication from the DoPT or the <strong>Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration<\/strong>; a schedule tentatively indicating a 24 August start lapsed once the court became seized of the matter.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Static Background<\/h3>\n<p><strong>Violence against healthcare workers:<\/strong> There is no dedicated central law; most States have enacted Medicare Service Persons and Institutions Acts, and the Epidemic Diseases (Amendment) Act, 2020 criminalised violence against healthcare personnel specifically during epidemics. Doctors&#8217; associations have long demanded a central statute.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Aravallis:<\/strong> India&#8217;s oldest fold mountain range, running roughly from Gujarat through Rajasthan and Haryana to Delhi, serving as an ecological barrier against desertification from the Thar. Protection instruments include the <strong>Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900<\/strong> in Haryana, Supreme Court orders restricting mining, the Aravalli Notification of 1992, and the proposed <strong>Aravalli Green Wall<\/strong> project. The definitional dispute \u2014 what counts as &#8220;Aravalli&#8221; for regulatory purposes \u2014 has permitted mining and construction in contested areas.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Senior citizens:<\/strong> The <strong>Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007<\/strong> creates a legal obligation of maintenance, provides for maintenance tribunals, and requires States to establish old-age homes. Schemes include the Atal Vayo Abhyuday Yojana and the National Programme for Health Care of the Elderly. <strong>Article 41<\/strong> is the enabling Directive Principle.<\/p>\n<p><strong>OBC creamy layer:<\/strong> Introduced in <strong>Indra Sawhney (1992)<\/strong> and operationalised by a 1993 Office Memorandum, the creamy layer test excludes children of those in higher services and above an income ceiling from non-salary sources. Successive rulings have held that <strong>salary income alone cannot be the basis<\/strong> for creamy layer exclusion \u2014 the principle the <em>Rohith Nathan<\/em> judgment applies.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Judicial deterrence versus legislative gap:<\/strong> Strong observations from the bench do not substitute for a central law on violence against healthcare workers. Bail cancellation in individual cases is remedial; a statutory offence with defined penalties is preventive.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Palghar incident undercuts the deterrence claim:<\/strong> A second assault while the first case was under Supreme Court scrutiny suggests that judicial signalling alone is not changing behaviour where political protection is perceived.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Aravalli definition delay is functionally a licence:<\/strong> Every month without a uniform definition is a month in which regulatory ambiguity permits mining in contested areas. The court&#8217;s impatience is proportionate to that cost.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Status reports are a weak remedy:<\/strong> A PIL from 2016 still producing directions for status reports in 2026 illustrates the limits of continuing mandamus. Elder care requires budgetary and institutional commitment, which courts cannot supply.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The CSE limbo is a compliance failure with individual costs:<\/strong> 958 candidates face indefinite uncertainty because the government sought permission to allocate services without implementing a judgment on reservation. Whatever the merits, the burden of the delay falls on candidates who are not parties to the dispute.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The creamy layer principle is settled and repeatedly re-litigated:<\/strong> That salary income alone cannot determine creamy layer status has been affirmed multiple times; continued administrative practice to the contrary suggests either institutional inertia or deliberate narrowing of reservation.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Enact a central law criminalising violence against healthcare workers and institutions, with fast-track adjudication and mandatory security protocols in hospitals.<\/li>\n<li>Complete the uniform Aravalli definition by the November deadline and enforce mining regulation on that basis, with tribal community consultation.<\/li>\n<li>Move elder care from status-report litigation to funded institutional provision under the 2007 Act, with published State-wise capacity data.<\/li>\n<li>Resolve the creamy layer determination method definitively through a revised Office Memorandum consistent with settled judicial principle.<\/li>\n<li>Delink foundation course commencement from the pending service allocation dispute so that recommended candidates are not indefinitely idled.<\/li>\n<li>Improve communication from the DoPT and the training academy to candidates awaiting allocation.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">Aravalli range &#038; Green Wall project<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Punjab Land Preservation Act 1900<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Maintenance and Welfare of Parents Act 2007<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Article 41<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Creamy layer &#038; Indra Sawhney<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">LBSNAA &#038; DoPT<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">10M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;Continuing mandamus has limits as an instrument of social policy.&#8221; Discuss with reference to long-pending public interest litigation on the welfare of senior citizens and on ecological protection. (10 marks, 150 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: Aravallis and elder welfare<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>The Aravalli range is among the oldest fold mountain systems in the world and acts as a barrier to the eastward spread of the Thar desert.<\/li>\n<li>The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 provides for maintenance tribunals and obliges State governments to establish old-age homes.<\/li>\n<li>Article 41 of the Constitution is a fundamental right guaranteeing public assistance to the aged.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 Article 41 is a Directive Principle of State Policy directing the State, within its economic capacity, to make effective provision for public assistance in old age; it is not an enforceable fundamental right. Statements 1 and 2 are correct.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= ARTICLE 22 ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"art-22\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">Prelims Miscellany \u2014 GS1 \u00b7 GS2 \u00b7 GS3<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>In Brief: Prelims Pointers from today&#8217;s edition<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Context<\/h3>\n<p>A consolidated round-up of the remaining reports in today&#8217;s Bengaluru City Edition carrying direct prelims value \u2014 West Asia, Europe, representation, science institutions, culture and Karnataka.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>World<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Iran warns U.S. energy facilities in the Gulf:<\/strong> Parliament Speaker <strong>Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf<\/strong> said &#8220;Strike our assets and you get struck&#8221;, warning that the region&#8217;s energy production chain is &#8220;sprawling, accessible and exposed&#8221; and that U.S. oil and gas companies share that exposure. Senior security official <strong>Mohsen Rezaei<\/strong> said Iran would announce a new <strong>restricted zone in the Gulf<\/strong> and approve <strong>new maps of a shipping corridor through the Strait of Hormuz<\/strong>; ships entering the new zone would be added to an Iranian sanctions list. The zone would begin where the U.S. naval blockade starts. Iran will commit to keeping Hormuz open only when the U.S. stops &#8220;sabotage, threats and attacks&#8221;. Oil prices rose to six-week highs. Foreign Ministry spokesperson <strong>Esmaeil Baqaei<\/strong> warned <strong>South Korea<\/strong> against military deployment or involvement in U.S. operations in the Strait, after Seoul said it was considering &#8220;contributions&#8221; to U.S. security efforts.<\/li>\n<li><strong>German far-right AfD wins Saxony-Anhalt:<\/strong> The <strong>Alternative for Germany<\/strong> won <strong>43.8%<\/strong> of the vote and <strong>39 of 83 seats<\/strong> \u2014 first place, but short of a majority \u2014 and appealed to CDU lawmakers to help it form the country&#8217;s first far-right State government since the Second World War. AfD leader <strong>Tino Chrupalla<\/strong> invoked a &#8220;centre-right conservative majority&#8221;, testing the mainstream parties&#8217; <strong>&#8220;firewall&#8221;<\/strong> against cooperation with the AfD. Chancellor <strong>Friedrich Merz<\/strong> said he was &#8220;deeply shocked&#8221; at the CDU&#8217;s <strong>17.2%<\/strong> \u2014 &#8220;the heaviest electoral defeat the party has suffered in years, in decades&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Israel-Lebanon:<\/strong> Israeli airstrikes killed <strong>12 people<\/strong> in south Lebanon including women and children, per the Lebanese Health Ministry \u2014 11 in <strong>Kfar Rumman<\/strong> including two children and four women, and a rescuer in a second strike. Israel said it struck Hezbollah infrastructure after two explosive drones were launched at its troops, and would continue while &#8220;remaining committed to the ceasefire agreement&#8221;. Hezbollah has not claimed any attack since <strong>20 June<\/strong>. Israeli operations have killed more than <strong>4,300 people since March<\/strong>, per Beirut. Separately, Defence Minister <strong>Israel Katz<\/strong> threatened &#8220;full-scale war&#8221; against the Palestinian Authority in case of an October 7-style attack.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Nepal mourning:<\/strong> Nepal held a <strong>national day of mourning<\/strong> with candlelight vigils for victims of the glacial floods, as families of missing hydropower workers prayed rescuers might find them alive. The <strong>26 August<\/strong> floods killed at least <strong>1,399 people<\/strong>, with more than <strong>5,500 missing<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Mladic funeral:<\/strong> Bosnian Serb war criminal <strong>Ratko Mladic<\/strong> was buried in Belgrade in a service attended by thousands, drawing EU accusations of the &#8220;glorification&#8221; of a man who died while serving a life sentence for <strong>genocide<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>EU and Greenland:<\/strong> European Commission president <strong>Ursula von der Leyen<\/strong> unveiled a <strong>200-million-euro ($232 million)<\/strong> investment package for Greenland, which President Trump has insisted should belong to the U.S. &#8220;The EU stands in full solidarity with the Kingdom of Denmark and the people of Greenland.&#8221;<\/li>\n<li><strong>U.K. anti-migrant protests:<\/strong> The government condemned protests by hundreds in <strong>Portsmouth<\/strong> against the arrival of migrants by dinghy from France; some 140 migrants arrived in one boat. Protesters also gathered in <strong>Dover<\/strong>. Police and Crime Commissioner <strong>Donna Jones<\/strong> said the U.K. had &#8220;lost control&#8221; of its coastline.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>National &#038; Institutional<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Women&#8217;s political leadership:<\/strong> Lok Sabha Speaker <strong>Om Birla<\/strong>, inaugurating a two-day all-India capacity building workshop on gender-responsive governance organised by the <strong>National Commission for Women<\/strong> in Faridabad, said the proposed <strong>33% reservation<\/strong> for women in the Lok Sabha and Legislative Assemblies would open new avenues for women&#8217;s political leadership, and that the focus must shift from providing support to enabling women to determine policies, programmes and legislation. He said the day was not far when women would account for more than 50% of those in public services.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Congress SC\/ST MPs petition the President:<\/strong> Thirty-two Congress MPs from SC and ST communities decided to petition President <strong>Droupadi Murmu<\/strong> over an alleged &#8220;purification yajna&#8221; held in Uttarakhand&#8217;s <strong>Haldwani<\/strong> on <strong>11 August<\/strong> following a rally addressed by party president Mallikarjun Kharge, describing it as an assault on dignity and an affront to the constitutional values of equality and abolition of untouchability. They will constitute a parliamentary forum on SC and ST issues; Rahul Gandhi had demanded an FIR under the <strong>SC\/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Manipur musician killed in Delhi:<\/strong> <strong>Chongtham Vikram Singh<\/strong>, a guitarist and musician from Imphal living in Delhi&#8217;s Ashram area, died of injuries from an alleged assault. Delhi Police registered an FIR under the <strong>Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita for mob lynching<\/strong> \u2014 <strong>Sections 103(2)<\/strong> (murder on grounds of race, caste or community by a group of five or more) and <strong>3(5)<\/strong> (crimes by a group with common intent) \u2014 arresting seven men and detaining a 15-year-old. The accused, aged 15 to 36, worked in food packaging and delivery from nearby dhabas; the complaint alleges prior threats after Singh complained of excessive noise. Former Manipur CM <strong>N. Biren Singh<\/strong> urged swift action.<\/li>\n<li><strong>&#8216;Hindutva influencer&#8217; remanded:<\/strong> A Delhi court remanded <strong>Swatantra Bhardwaj<\/strong> to <strong>14 days&#8217; judicial custody<\/strong> in connection with the alleged assault on the father of a student during a July protest at Jantar Mantar organised by the Cockroach Janta Party. He will be produced again on <strong>21 September<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>SC on journalist&#8217;s digital data:<\/strong> The Supreme Court asked the Uttar Pradesh Police why they needed the digital footprint of <strong>Abhishek Upadhyay<\/strong>, an independent journalist who flagged alleged misappropriation of donations to the Ayodhya Ram temple, to investigate a road-rage case against him. The Bench headed by CJI Surya Kant directed the Ghaziabad Police Commissioner to file an affidavit detailing information sought from platform X.<\/li>\n<li><strong>IISc&#8217;s FSID:<\/strong> The <strong>Foundation for Science, Innovation and Development<\/strong>, a single-window interface to IISc&#8217;s deep science and deep-tech capabilities, said it would undertake <strong>1,000 industry projects<\/strong> and build a portfolio of <strong>300 deep-tech start-ups by 2030<\/strong>, unveiling a new governance model with its first industry-leader CEO, <strong>Omprakash Subbarao<\/strong>, on the path to a self-sustaining <strong>Section 8 company<\/strong>. Vision: &#8220;Built on Science, Scaled for the World&#8221;, with two pillars \u2014 Innovation and Incubation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Inflation and festive prices:<\/strong> Congress general secretary <strong>Jairam Ramesh<\/strong> said wholesale onion prices had <strong>doubled in three weeks<\/strong> and sugar had risen <strong>25%<\/strong>, with arhar, urad, mustard, refined oil and dry fruits also costlier ahead of Deepavali, accusing the government of &#8220;statistical jugglery&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><strong>National Film Awards move to Gujarat:<\/strong> The <strong>72nd National Film Awards<\/strong> will be presented by President Droupadi Murmu on <strong>22 September<\/strong> at <strong>Ekta Nagar, Gujarat<\/strong> \u2014 the first time outside the traditional Delhi venue since the first ceremony in 1954, apart from the 17th and 18th editions held in Madras in 1970 and 1971. Winners announced in July include <em>Article 370<\/em> as best feature film, <strong>Yami Gautam<\/strong> as best actress, <strong>Mammootty<\/strong> and <strong>Kartik Aaryan<\/strong> sharing best actor for <em>Bramayugam<\/em> and <em>Chandu Champion<\/em>, and <strong>Randeep Hooda<\/strong> as best debut director for <em>Swatantrya Veer Savarkar<\/em>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Kashmir&#8217;s first international film festival:<\/strong> Kashmir, where all 15 cinema halls closed during three decades of militancy, hosted its first four-day international film festival, opening with the Lebanese film <em>Dead Dog<\/em> at the Inox in Srinagar \u2014 the first functional cinema hall to reopen in the valley after 23 years, in 2022. Chief Minister <strong>Omar Abdullah<\/strong> called it &#8220;a new chapter in the long-standing relationship between J&#038;K and cinema&#8221; and &#8220;a declaration of intent&#8221; about Kashmir&#8217;s potential as a global filmmaking destination. Around <strong>1,100 entries<\/strong> were received and <strong>135 films from 41 countries<\/strong> shortlisted, including more than 60 foreign films, with venues at SKICC and Inox in Srinagar, Gulmarg and Jammu.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-sec\">\n<h3>Business, Karnataka &#038; Archives<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>JLR job cuts:<\/strong> <strong>Jaguar Land Rover<\/strong>, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tata Motors Passenger Vehicles Limited, will reduce its global workforce by about <strong>4,000 roles over two years<\/strong> under a &#8220;strategic transformation programme&#8221;, not expected to impact direct manufacturing jobs and to be achieved through voluntary means where possible. Under its &#8220;Growth Reimagined&#8221; strategy announced on <strong>19 June 2026<\/strong>, JLR targets approximately <strong>\u00a31.7 billion of savings over two years<\/strong> to reduce break-evens towards <strong>3,00,000 units<\/strong>, while committing to invest <strong>\u00a315-18 billion<\/strong> in electrification, digital technologies and advanced manufacturing over five years. CEO <strong>P.B. Balaji<\/strong> cited technological change, intense competition and geopolitical uncertainty.<\/li>\n<li><strong>RBI liquidity operations:<\/strong> The RBI mopped up over <strong>\u20b96 lakh crore<\/strong> in two auctions with an underwhelming response. Against a notified \u20b97 lakh crore for the <strong>30-day VRRR<\/strong>, bids of just over <strong>\u20b92.59 lakh crore<\/strong> were received, accepted at a cut-off and weighted average rate of <strong>5.24%<\/strong>. An <strong>overnight VRRR<\/strong> of \u20b95 lakh crore notified amount drew <strong>\u20b93,53,390 crore<\/strong> \u2014 over 70% of the notified amount \u2014 accepted in full at 5.24%, indicating lenders prefer parking funds for shorter tenures.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Coal rake loading:<\/strong> Loading of coal rakes for the power sector grew about <strong>20% between 3 and 6 September<\/strong>, per the Coal Ministry, which is monitoring thermal plants with stocks below 25% of normal requirements. Per Central Electricity Authority data, <strong>53 domestic coal-fired plants<\/strong> were at the critical normative level as on 5 September.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Copper and RBL:<\/strong> Copper headed towards a record high, with LME benchmark copper up 0.1% at <strong>$14,430 a tonne<\/strong>, on prospects of shortages outside the U.S. and a softer dollar. <strong>RBL Bank<\/strong> approved mobilisation of up to <strong>$1 billion<\/strong> from overseas investors through a Euro Medium Term Note Programme under Regulation S of the U.S. Securities Act, 1933.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Karnataka:<\/strong> The State Cabinet expansion is likely to be delayed by celebrations marking <strong>100 days<\/strong> of the <strong>D.K. Shivakumar-led Congress government<\/strong> and a three-day special session of the legislature, postponing the filling of two vacant Cabinet posts. Separately, <strong>seven persons were killed<\/strong> in two road accidents in <strong>Kolar and Chickballapur<\/strong> districts, four of them from one family.<\/li>\n<li><strong>News in numbers:<\/strong> Over <strong>1,000 teachers<\/strong> who lost jobs following court rulings launched a sit-in outside West Bengal&#8217;s education department headquarters, &#8216;Bikash Bhavan&#8217;. Uttar Pradesh recorded a <strong>6.97% decline in road accidents<\/strong>, an 8.03% fall in fatalities and a 6.11% reduction in injuries at locations covered under the <strong>Zero Fatality District<\/strong> scheme between January and August. Kerala police booked <strong>2,799 people<\/strong> for drunk driving in a week-long special drive.<\/li>\n<li><strong>From the archives:<\/strong> Fifty years ago (8 September 1976), Pakistan&#8217;s Prime Minister <strong>Z.A. Bhutto<\/strong> wrote to British Prime Minister James Callaghan asking Britain to return the <strong>Kohinoor<\/strong> diamond, in British possession since 1849 and part of the crown jewels after the annexation of Punjab. A hundred years ago (8 September 1926), General <strong>Hertzog<\/strong> foreshadowed a compromise on South Africa&#8217;s Flag Bill and said he would urge international recognition of South Africa&#8217;s national status as equal to Britain&#8217;s.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Faith column \u2014 Attaining liberation:<\/strong> R. Narayanan&#8217;s discourse holds that human birth carries advantages that aid liberation, and that faculties should be used for devotion. Repeated births arise from ignorance, which can be banished by worship; <strong>Tirukkural verse 358<\/strong> speaks of ridding oneself of ignorance, while <em>Thiruvachagam<\/em> holds that an <em>atma<\/em> can have 84,000 possible births. <strong>Manickavachagar<\/strong> describes having taken birth as grass, worm, animals, birds, snakes, stones, humans, ghosts, sages and devas; <strong>Avvaiyar<\/strong> says human birth is rare good fortune and advises time spent in the company of the virtuous.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-critical\">\n        <strong>\u26a0 Critical Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Hormuz is becoming a legally contested space:<\/strong> Declaring a restricted zone and publishing new passage maps is an attempt to create facts that harden into practice. Under UNCLOS, transit passage through international straits is non-suspendable and binds Iran as customary law \u2014 but customary law has no automatic enforcement.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The German firewall is under structural strain:<\/strong> A party winning 43.8% but excluded from government tests the democratic logic of cordoning off a large electoral bloc. The cordon protects constitutional norms; its persistence also fuels the anti-establishment grievance that sustains the party.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Women&#8217;s reservation remains contingent:<\/strong> The 33% quota was enacted through the 106th Amendment but its operation is conditional on the census and delimitation exercise. Speeches about its transformative potential precede its actual implementation.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Mob lynching provisions are being used:<\/strong> Section 103(2) of the BNS created a distinct offence for murder by a group of five or more on grounds of race, caste or community \u2014 invoked here for the killing of a musician from the Northeast, a category of violence long documented and rarely charged as such.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Kashmir festival is soft-power infrastructure:<\/strong> Reopening cultural space after three decades has value beyond tourism, though normalisation claims should be assessed against political and civil liberties indicators rather than event calendars.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-forward\">\n        <strong>\u2705 Way Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Work through the IMO and UNCLOS framework to reaffirm the non-suspendable character of transit passage through Hormuz, while diversifying India&#8217;s energy sourcing.<\/li>\n<li>Operationalise the women&#8217;s reservation through timely completion of the census and delimitation, alongside capacity-building for women legislators.<\/li>\n<li>Ensure prompt and visible prosecution under the BNS mob lynching provisions, particularly in cases involving people from the Northeast in metropolitan cities.<\/li>\n<li>Protect journalists&#8217; digital privacy by requiring narrowly tailored, judicially reviewable data requests in police investigations.<\/li>\n<li>Scale the deep-tech translation model pioneered by IISc&#8217;s FSID to other national institutes of science and technology.<\/li>\n<li>Sustain cultural reopening in Jammu and Kashmir with parallel attention to civil liberties and local employment in the creative economy.<\/li>\n<\/ul><\/div>\n<div class=\"lias-exam\">\n<p>\n          <strong>\ud83d\udcdd Prelims Relevance<\/strong><br \/><span class=\"lias-pill\">Strait of Hormuz &#038; transit passage<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">106th Amendment \u2014 women&#8217;s reservation<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">BNS Sections 103(2) and 3(5)<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">National Commission for Women<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Section 8 companies<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Variable Rate Reverse Repo<\/span><br \/>\n          <span class=\"lias-pill\">Kohinoor &#038; annexation of Punjab<\/span>\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          <span class=\"lias-marks\">10M<\/span><br \/>\n          <em>Mains Question:<\/em> &#8220;Reservation of seats for women in legislatures is a necessary but insufficient condition for gender-responsive governance.&#8221; Discuss. (10 marks, 150 words)\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>MCQ: Miscellany from today&#8217;s edition<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>The 106th Constitutional Amendment Act provides for reservation of one-third of seats for women in the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies.<\/li>\n<li>The reservation under this Amendment takes effect immediately upon its commencement, without reference to any census or delimitation.<\/li>\n<li>The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (b)<\/b> \u2014 The Amendment&#8217;s operation is expressly contingent on the publication of the relevant census figures and the subsequent delimitation exercise, which makes statement 2 incorrect. Statements 1 and 3 are accurate.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= MCQ BANK ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-art\" id=\"mcq-bank\">\n<p>\n        <span class=\"lias-tag\">Prelims<\/span><\/p>\n<h2>\ud83d\udcdd Quick Prelims Revision \u2014 MCQ Bank<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>Q1 \u2014 Religious endowments and the Constitution<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Which of the following best describes the effect of Article 25(2)(a) of the Constitution?<\/p>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>It permits the State to prohibit religious practice on grounds of public interest<\/li>\n<li>It permits the State to regulate or restrict secular activity associated with religious practice<\/li>\n<li>It confers on religious denominations the right to own and acquire property<\/li>\n<li>It exempts religious institutions from taxation<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (b)<\/b> \u2014 Article 25(2)(a) saves State laws regulating economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice \u2014 the constitutional basis for endowments legislation.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>Q2 \u2014 Carbon border adjustment<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements about carbon border adjustment mechanisms:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Their stated objective is to prevent carbon leakage arising from differing carbon prices across jurisdictions.<\/li>\n<li>They typically allow a deduction for a carbon price already paid in the country of origin.<\/li>\n<li>The European Union&#8217;s mechanism in its initial coverage includes iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (d)<\/b> \u2014 All three are correct, and the second is precisely the provision under which India&#8217;s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme has now been recognised by the United Kingdom.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>Q3 \u2014 Citizenship<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">With reference to the National Register of Citizens, consider the following:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>The legal basis for preparation of a National Register of Citizens is found in Section 14A of the Citizenship Act, 1955.<\/li>\n<li>The cut-off date for the Assam NRC is 24 March 1971.<\/li>\n<li>State Legislative Assemblies are competent to enact laws determining citizenship within their territory.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (a)<\/b> \u2014 Citizenship is Entry 17 of the Union List; State Assemblies cannot legislate on it, which is why State resolutions on an NRC can only express intent. Statements 1 and 2 are correct.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>Q4 \u2014 Statistical system<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Which of the following statements about India&#8217;s national accounts is correct?<\/p>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>The GDP deflator is derived from the Consumer Price Index alone<\/li>\n<li>Double deflation applies separate price indices to output and to intermediate inputs<\/li>\n<li>Gross Value Added is measured at market prices while GDP is measured at basic prices<\/li>\n<li>The National Statistical Commission is established under the Collection of Statistics Act<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (b)<\/b> \u2014 GVA is measured at basic prices and GDP at market prices (GDP = GVA + product taxes \u2212 product subsidies); the deflator is implicit from nominal and real GDP; and the NSC was set up by executive resolution, not statute.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>Q5 \u2014 Defence procurement<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">In the sequence of India&#8217;s capital defence acquisition, which step comes first?<\/p>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>Issue of Request for Proposal<\/li>\n<li>Field evaluation trials<\/li>\n<li>Acceptance of Necessity by the Defence Acquisition Council<\/li>\n<li>Cost negotiation by the Contract Negotiation Committee<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (c)<\/b> \u2014 Acceptance of Necessity is the first formal approval, after which the RFP is issued, trials conducted, and cost negotiated before contract signature.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>Q6 \u2014 Anti-money laundering<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>The Financial Intelligence Unit-India receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports.<\/li>\n<li>Virtual Digital Asset service providers have been brought within the reporting obligations of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act.<\/li>\n<li>The FATF Travel Rule requires originator and beneficiary information to accompany transfers, including transfers of virtual assets.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (d)<\/b> \u2014 All three are correct and together describe the framework being tested by the emergence of virtual-asset-settled hawala networks.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>Q7 \u2014 Steel and emissions<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Direct Reduced Iron (DRI) production differs from the blast furnace route principally because:<\/p>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>It requires no iron ore<\/li>\n<li>Iron ore is reduced in the solid state using natural gas or hydrogen rather than melted with coking coal<\/li>\n<li>It produces steel directly without any furnace<\/li>\n<li>It relies exclusively on recycled scrap<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (b)<\/b> \u2014 DRI, or sponge iron, is produced by reducing iron ore in the solid state using a reducing gas \u2014 natural gas today and potentially green hydrogen \u2014 and is then melted in an electric arc furnace.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>Q8 \u2014 Tobacco and nicotine law<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Which of the following statements is correct?<\/p>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>The Prohibition of Electronic Cigarettes Act, 2019 also prohibits tobacco-free oral nicotine pouches<\/li>\n<li>The Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act, 2003 regulates advertising and sale of tobacco products<\/li>\n<li>Nicotine is listed as a narcotic substance under the NDPS Act, 1985<\/li>\n<li>India is not a party to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (b)<\/b> \u2014 PECA covers electronic cigarettes, which contain a device and produce vapour; nicotine is not a narcotic under the NDPS Act; and India is a party to the WHO FCTC.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>Q9 \u2014 Elections<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Consider the following statements about the Model Code of Conduct:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>It comes into force from the date of announcement of the election schedule by the Election Commission.<\/li>\n<li>It has statutory backing under the Representation of the People Act, 1951.<\/li>\n<li>In the case of byelections, it applies in the districts encompassing the poll-bound constituencies.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>1 and 2 only<\/li>\n<li>1 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>2 and 3 only<\/li>\n<li>1, 2 and 3<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (b)<\/b> \u2014 The Model Code is a consensual document evolved among political parties and enforced by the ECI under Article 324; it has no direct statutory backing, though specific violations may attract legal provisions. Statements 1 and 3 are correct.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<details class=\"lias-mcq\">\n<summary>Q10 \u2014 Vehicle fuels<\/summary>\n<div class=\"lias-mcq-body\">\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">Which of the following pairs is correctly matched?<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>E20 \u2014 20% ethanol blended in petrol<\/li>\n<li>CBG \u2014 Compressed Biogas, a renewable fuel produced from biomass and waste<\/li>\n<li>PM E-DRIVE \u2014 a scheme supporting adoption of electric mobility<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p class=\"lias-mcq-q\">How many of the above are correctly matched?<\/p>\n<ol type=\"a\">\n<li>Only one<\/li>\n<li>Only two<\/li>\n<li>All three<\/li>\n<li>None<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><b>Answer: (c)<\/b> \u2014 All three are correctly matched. Note the distinction between CNG (a fossil fuel) and CBG (renewable), which is frequently tested.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/details>\n<p>      <a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"lias-top\" href=\"#top\">\u2191 Back to top<\/a>\n    <\/div>\n<p>    <!-- ================= FAQ ================= --><\/p>\n<div class=\"lias-faq-wrap\" id=\"faq-section\">\n<h2>\u2753 FAQs<\/h2>\n<p class=\"lias-faq-sub\">Frequently asked exam-oriented questions \u2014 8 September 2026 edition<\/p>\n<details class=\"lias-faq\">\n<summary>Why does recognition of India&#8217;s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme by the U.K. reduce the burden on exporters?<\/summary>\n<p>A carbon border adjustment mechanism charges imports for their embedded carbon at the importing country&#8217;s carbon price, so that domestic producers paying a carbon price are not undercut. Almost all such designs allow a deduction for carbon already priced in the exporting country \u2014 otherwise the same tonne would be taxed twice. By listing the CCTS as a qualifying overseas carbon pricing scheme, the U.K. allows Indian producers to net off what they paid domestically. The size of the relief, however, depends on the level of India&#8217;s own carbon price: a low domestic price yields a small deduction.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n<details class=\"lias-faq\">\n<summary>Why is the &#8220;relining window&#8221; so important for green steel?<\/summary>\n<p>A blast furnace must be relined roughly every two decades, and relining extends its life by another 15-20 years. The decision point is therefore binary: reline, and coal-based emissions are locked in for another generation; or divert the same capital to a DRI-EAF plant, which can later run on green hydrogen. More than 43 million tonnes per annum of Indian blast furnace capacity is due for relining before 2030, and most announced BF-BOF plants have not broken ground \u2014 which is why researchers describe the opportunity as &#8220;just a redirection&#8221; rather than an additional investment.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n<details class=\"lias-faq\">\n<summary>What exactly is the problem with the UN&#8217;s new world map for India?<\/summary>\n<p>Two things. First, the map depicts Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin as caught between Indian and Chinese lines \u2014 and unlike the 2011 UN map, it does not label these as &#8220;claim lines&#8221;, which turns a depiction of contested claims into what reads as settled geography. Second, the map carries an explanatory note for the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir but no comparable note for these areas, an asymmetry with no principled basis. India voted for the resolution on the underlying principle of equal-area projection while recording that this endorses no specific map, projection or boundary depiction \u2014 a careful separation of the cartographic-equity question from the political-cartography question.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n<details class=\"lias-faq\">\n<summary>Why can&#8217;t nicotine pouches simply be banned under existing tobacco law?<\/summary>\n<p>Because COTPA regulates <em>tobacco<\/em> products, and nicotine pouches are tobacco-free. PECA covers electronic cigarettes, and pouches have no electronic device and produce no vapour. Nicotine is not scheduled under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, though certain nicotine gums and lozenges are exempted under Schedule K \u2014 which cuts both ways in the argument. The practical route the author identifies is not new legislation at all: the products already fall under a &#8220;restricted&#8221; customs classification, so a notification under the Customs Act and the Foreign Trade Act on health grounds could prohibit import and sale immediately.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n<details class=\"lias-faq\">\n<summary>Why is the pre-SIR deletion of 13 lakh names in Delhi more concerning than deletions during the SIR?<\/summary>\n<p>Because the procedural protections differ. A special intensive revision publishes a draft roll and opens a claims-and-objections period, so a citizen can see her name is missing and contest it. Routine updation has neither. It proceeds through individual applications, Form-7 objections and <em>suo motu<\/em> ERO action on a BLO field report \u2014 and in every case the Registration of Electors Rules require notice. When a voter finds her name neither on the roll nor on any deletion list, she has nothing to appeal against, which is why the question of whether notices were served is the central one.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n<details class=\"lias-faq\">\n<summary>If a 1-GW data centre cannot be air-cooled, what did Google actually commit to?<\/summary>\n<p>Almost certainly a hybrid design. Air-cooling can remove roughly 40 kW per rack, while a rack of modern AI accelerators can emit 120-150 kW \u2014 so air alone would require the racks to sit inside a wind tunnel, with power consumption rising steeply. The standard industry answer is air-cooling for low-density servers and general areas, rear-door heat exchangers to extend air-cooling to about 50 kW, and direct-to-chip liquid cooling for high-density AI clusters. The public assurance addresses the water concern that drove local protests, but communities are entitled to the full cooling architecture, along with power draw and noise data.<\/p>\n<\/details><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p><br \/>\n<br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.legacyias.com\/the-hindu-upsc-news-analysis-for-08-september-2026\/\">Source link <\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>GS2 \u00b7 GS3 \u2014 Urban Governance &#038; Disaster Management Delhi HC orders audit of hostels&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":813,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1712],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-838","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-the-hindu-news-analysis-september-2026"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/x.sheep-mine.ts.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/838","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/x.sheep-mine.ts.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/x.sheep-mine.ts.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/x.sheep-mine.ts.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/x.sheep-mine.ts.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=838"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/x.sheep-mine.ts.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/838\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/x.sheep-mine.ts.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/813"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/x.sheep-mine.ts.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=838"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/x.sheep-mine.ts.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=838"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/x.sheep-mine.ts.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=838"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}